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This thesis assesses the prospect for democracy in Colombia. In a single case 
study, it argues that Colombia is a democracy at risk. The work attempts to answer the 
following questions: 
• Why, after four decades of democratic processes, has Colombia's political 
society failed to achieve full democratization? 
• Is Colombia vulnerable to democratic breakdown? 
• What possible policy actions could the United States explore that would 
assist in halting Colombia's downward democratic spiral? 
This Latin American country, the fourth largest in South America, the Western 
Hemisphere's second oldest democracy and populated by almost thirty-seven million 
people, is facing a myriad of severe social, economic and political problems. The 
magnitude of the challenge of coping with ever-increasing levels of social violence, civil 
disorder, corruption, narco-trafficking, and insurgency is threatening the very fabric of 
civil and political society. Despite four decades of democratic processes, Colombia's 
political society has yet to complete democratic consolidation, much less full 
democratization. Furthermore, it is the incompleteness of its democratic consolidation 
that exacerbates and accelerates the downward spiral of the country's democracy and 
renders it vulnerable to breakdown. Colombia's political society - those institutions with 
control over the political decision making process - is the main culprit in hindering the 
establishment of full liberal democracy and facilitating a move away from the endemic 
political violence that plagues the country today. 
v 
The breakdown of democracy in Colombia could affect democratic institutions 
throughout the area. This single event - a non-democratic Colombia - would alter the 
balance of power in Latin America and significantly affect current U.S. policy in the 
region. 
VI 
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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the prospects for democracy in Colombia. 
In a single case study, the work argues that Colombia is a democracy at risk. The work 
will attempt to answer the following questions: 
• Why, after four decades of democratic processes, has Colombia's political 
society failed to achieve full democratization? 
• Is Colombia vulnerable to democratic breakdown? 
• What possible policy actions could the United States explore that would 
assist in halting Colombia's downward democratic spiral? 
This Latin American country, the fourth largest in South America, the Western 
Hemisphere's second oldest democracy and populated by almost thirty-seven million 
people, is facing a myriad of severe social, economic and political problems. The 
magnitude of the challenge of coping with ever-increasing levels of social violence, civil 
disorder, corruption, narco-trafficking, and insurgency is threatening the very fabric of 
civil and political society. 
Despite four decades of democratic processes, Colombia's political society has 
yet to fully consolidate democracy. The lack of democratic consolidation exacerbates 
and accelerates Colombia's downward spiral and renders democracy vulnerable to 
breakdown. I contend that procedural democracy, as defined by Robert A. Dahl, is 
necessary but not sufficient for full democratization. The necessary and sufficient 
elements that would constitute full democratization are the behavioral, attitudinal, and 
constitutional tenets posited by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan in Problems of 
Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
xiii 
Communist Europe. The work argues that Colombia's political society - those people 
and institutions with control over the political decision making process - is the main 
culprit in hindering the establishment of full liberal democracy and facilitating a move 
away from the endemic political violence that plagues the country today. The thesis will 
look at three actors in the Colombian political society - political institutions, the military 
and the guerrillas - with regard to their roles in democratic transition and consolidation. 
Furthermore, the thesis will explore possible options for U.S. policy that could assist the 
Pastrana regime in stabilizing the democratic process in the country. 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it seeks to explain Colombia's 
incomplete consolidation and its potential for democratic breakdown. The thesis focuses 
on how the political institutions, the military, and the guerrillas adapt and adjust to 
overcome the political challenges facing Colombia. Second, it attempts to review U.S. 
policy, and to make recommendations that would assist the Colombian government in 
stabilizing the democratic process in the country. 
In Chapter II, the thesis examines the extent to which the Liberal and 
Conservative parties, and the National Front obstructed the development of political 
institutions in Colombia. That is, it evaluates how this closed two-party system impeded 
democratic consolidation. What was the impact of the National Front on democracy? 
What elements of this type of political arrangement contribute to breakdown? The 
chapter argues that Colombia's troubles with democratization began with the two-party 
system, deepened with the creation of the National Front, and finally reached a crisis 
point with the abolishment of the National Front. 
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Chapter III examines the role of the Colombian military. It explores current civil-
military relations to determine whether or not the military has been a positive force in the 
democratization of the country. This chapter evaluates what influences have shaped the 
military, which has remained loyal to the democratic way oflife. 
Chapter IV considers the role played by the guerrillas in Colombian society. The 
chapter examines the negative impact of over forty years of internal conflict on 
democratization. Why has part of this disloyal opposition renounced disloyalty and 
joined the democratic process? Why have others chosen to remain outside the 
democratic process? The chapter analyzes two relatively new phenomena: the narco-
guerrilla connection and the role of para-military units in Colombian society. 
Finally, Chapter V offers some conclusions on the current status of democracy in 
Colombia. How is the Pastrana administration preparing to deal with the immense 
problems facing the nation? President Pastrana is enjoying an unprecedented level of 
high credibility and legitimacy, but he must coordinate a coherent national security 
strategy before the honeymoon is over. The thesis will also examine the implications of a 
non-democratic Colombia in the region. How would the success of guerrilla forces and 
drug cartels influence the democratic development of countries such as Venezuela, Peru, 
Bolivia and Ecuador? This chapter also looks at the role the United States can play in 
halting the downward spiral in which the Colombian nation finds itself. How can the 
U.S. avoid becoming an obstacle in the democratization process? The thesis argues this 
can be accomplished by helping to strengthen the judicial and legislative branches of 
government and sponsoring political institution building. 
xv 
The argument that democracy in Colombia is at risk is nothing new to 
policymakers, scholars and regional experts of Latin American affairs. Linz, Stepan, La 
Rotta, Thoumi and others all have reached the same conclusion - that democracy in 
Colombia, barring major political, social, economic, and military reforms, is on the verge 
of collapse. There is ample evidence that high levels of corruption, domestic violence, 
institutional decline, and political disintegration in Colombian society are the principal 
motives for the "erosion of democracy." 1 The erosion of the political elite's legitimacy, 
efficacy, and effectiveness to govern has directly contributed to the increase in political 
violence and a weakening of the state. It is not new that Colombia needs to address 
significant problems within its political institutions in order to solidify its democratic 
gains, or that the country's political society needs to develop a national strategy that 
would lead to the establishment of full democratization. Nor, that t~e strategy should 
include elements that would address the structural shortcomings of Colombia's political 
institutions and assist in the consolidation of the state. 
What is new in this work, is the discussion of the potential breakdown of 
democracy in Colombia within the framework of legitimacy, effectiveness and efficacy 
provided by Juan Linz, while specifically examining Colombia's structural and non-
structural problems. Using the above discussion as a departure point, we can confirm that 
the current Colombian regime is in the process of breakdown as a democratic institution. 
It may be, as John A. Peeler points out, that "we are witnessing a process of de-
1 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay." World Politics, #27 Apr 1965, pp. 
392-393. 
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consolidation, of slow-motion breakdown."2 However, some may argue, as does this 
thesis, that democratic consolidation never occurred. Although the basic tenets for 
consolidation - rules of the game, mass participation and political institutions - have 
been present, Colombia lacks the behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional requirements 
for full democratization. Colombia's political elites, to use Linz's words, have shown "a 
tendency to blame the accumulation of problems on neglect by a previous regime, rather 
than on the intractability of social reality."3 
Colombia's structural problems, its political institutions, have hindered rather 
than promoted democratization. These institutions - Conservative and Liberal party -
exercised a monopoly on the division of power in the political arena. This has resulted in 
the exclusion of other political actors, which have turned to the use of violence as a form 
of political expression. 
The non-structural problems - the guerillas and the cartels - seek to destroy the 
democratic process through the exploitation of fissures within a weak state. Colombia's 
problems with respect to the guerrillas and the cartels are twofold: 1) the threat to 
national security produced by the insurgency; and 2) the violent problems associated with 
the drug trade, which is a matter of internal national defense. 
The breakdown of democracy in Colombia could affect democratic institutions 
throughout the area. This single event - a non-democratic Colombia - would alter the 
2 John A. Peeler, "Elite Settlements and Democratic Consolidation: Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela," 
in John Higley and Richard Gunther eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and 
Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 329. 
3 Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 41. 
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This thesis assesses the prospects for democracy in Colombia. In a single case 
study, it argues that Colombia is a democracy at risk. The work attempts to answer the 
following questions: 
• Why, after four decades of democratic processes, has Colombia's political 
society failed to achieve full democratization? 
• Is Colombia vulnerable to democratic breakdown? 
• What possible policy actions could the United States explore that would 
assist in halting Colombia's downward democratic spiral? 
B. BACKGROUND 
Colombia's democracy, one of Latin America's most enduring, is slowly dying. 
Colombia is not one of those nations identified in Huntington's The Third Wave as a 
relative newcomer to democracy; its longevity has been well documented. I This nation is 
the second oldest democracy in the Americas, tracing its democratic roots at least to the 
late 1840s.2 Yet, today one can barely pick up a major daily newspaper or tune to a major 
broadcast news system, in the United States or Colombia, without hearing troubling 
references to this once heralded model of democracy. 
I Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
2 Ronald P. Archer, "Party Strength and Weakness in Colombia's Besieged Democracy," in Scott 
Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully eds., Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p.l64. 
In order to stabilize the unrest in the country, fonner Colombian President Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998) made the reduction of guerrillas in the field, criminals in the streets, 
and "mulas" transporting narcotics overseas a cornerstone of his Plan de Salta Social 
[Social Leap Plan). 3 However, by 1994 the Samper government was paralyzed by 
allegations of corruption and inefficiency, which led to the government's inability to . 
respond to the political and social difficulties challenging the nation. These 
circumstances aggravated the government's inabil~ty to deal with social and political 
changes through the use of institutions that link the political elites with the masses. But 
the problems facing Colombia today are more complex and violent than those stated 
above, and they seem to be threatening the legitimacy of Colombia's political institutions. 
Ronald P. Archer states, "[t]hat democracy in Colombia is in trouble is beyond 
doubt.,>4 This Latin American country, the fourth largest in South America and populated 
by almost thirty-seven million people, is facing a myriad of severe social, economic and 
political problems. The magnitude of the challenge of coping with ever-increasing levels 
of social violence, civil disorder, corruption, narco-trafficking and insurgency is 
threatening the very fabric of civil and political society. 
Colombia, since the 1940s, has earned its unfortunate reputation as one of the 
world's most violent nations.s Its lack of rule of law and weak political society has 
hindered the full democratization of the country. The immediate consequence of a third 
l Emesto P. Samper, "The Time of the People," Inauguration Address of the President (Bogota: Imprenta 
Nacional, 1994), p. 3 
4 Ronald P. Archer, p. 167. 
~ Jorge P. Osterling, Democracy in Colombia (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1989), p. x. 
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reverse wave6 of democracy originating in Colombia could be the threat to the "stability 
of those Latin American countries that are still in the process of reforming their obsolete 
political and economic systems and strengthening their democratic institutions.,,7 
Opposition forces in countries like Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela could use 
Colombia's democratic demise to reverse democracy in those countries. The breakdown 
of democracy in Colombia could affect democratic institutions throughout the area. This 
single event - a non-democratic Colombia - would alter the political balance in Latin 
America and significantly affect current U.S. policy in the region. 
By the 1990s, Colombia was a country in political shambles. The impact of over 
forty years of guerrilla activity, coupled with the relative new phenomenon of narco-
terrorism resulted in a significant threat to democratic stability in the country. The 
guerrillas and drug traffickers undermine the government's effectiveness, efficacy and 
legitimacy. Juan Linz tells us that effectiveness is the government's capacity to 
implement policies; efficacy, the government's ability to find solutions; and legitimacy, 
the moral authority to rule the citizenship.8 President Ernesto Samper's (1994-1998) 
campaign accepted at least $6 million in political donations from the drug cartels in 1994. 
The Executive Cabinet under Samper was in shambles due to corruption charges. Today, 
insurgents control 600 out of 1024 municipalities.9 The Colombian military is waging a 
war on two fronts - against the guerrillas and the cartels. Though the armed forces do not 
6 Huntington explains that a 'reverse wave' is when some of the countries transitioning to democracy return 
to an authoritarian form of government. 
7 Henry Raymont, "Latin America: Guerrilla Offensive Rekindle Militarism," in FBIS [database on-line] 
(accessed 11 September 1997), identifier no. FBIS-TOT -97 -001-L. 
8 Juan J. Linz, pp. 16-24. 
9 Henry Raymont, p. 6. 
3 
have a history of interfering with the government, there is a fear of an upsurge in 
militarism, due to the mounting frustration the military institution is experiencing in the 
field. 
However, the election of Andres Pastrana in June 1998 does offer new hope and a 
window of opportunity. The challenge now becomes to support democracy in such a 
volatile environment and to develop policies that will strengthen democratic institutions. 
Despite four decades of democratic processes, Colombia's political society has 
yet to fully consolidate democracy. The lack of democratic consolidation exacerbates and 
accelerates Colombia's downward spiral and renders democracy vulnerable to 
breakdown. I contend that procedural democracy, as defined by Robert A. Dahl, is 
necessary but not sufficient for full democratization. The necessary and sufficient 
elements that would constitute full democratization are the behavioral, attitudinal, and 
constitutional tenets posited by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan in Problems of 
Democratic Transitions and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-
Communist Europe. The thesis argues that Colombia's political society - those people 
and institutions with control over the political decision making process - is the main 
culprit in hindering the establishment of full liberal democracy and facilitating a move 
away from the endemic political violence that plagues the country today. 
The thesis will look at three actors in the Colombian political society - political 
institutions, the military and the guerrillas - with regard to their roles in democratic 
transition and consolidation. Furthermore, the thesis will explore possible options for 
4 
u.s. policy that could assist the Pastrana regime in stabilizing the democratic process in 
the country. 
c. TERMS AND THEORY 
Before discussing the theoretical framework of this thesis it is necessary to define 
the terms used. What is meant by democracy? What are democratic transition, 
consolidation, and democratization? When are transition, consolidation, and 
democratization considered complete? 
Theoretically, democracy is 
that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle 
for the people's vote.1O 
However, the above definition is too theoretical and this study requires a 
definition with an operational focus. Robert Dahl posits the most generally accepted 
operational definition of democracy. He states in Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy that 
a "procedural minimum" democracy exists when the following conditions are present: 1) 
elected officials; 2) free and fair elections; 3) inclusive suffrage; 4) the right to run for 
office; 5) freedom of expression; 6) freedom of information; and 7) freedom of 
association. II Other authors such as Philippe C. Schmiter and Terry L. Karl (1993), 
Guillermo O'Donnell (1995), and Adam Przeworski (1992) seem to agree that these are 
the minimum conditions that must be present before a regime can be called democratic. 
10 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1943), p. 
269. 
II Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 11. 
5 
This minimum standard of democracy can be found in Colombian so~iety today. 
It is the more difficult standard of 'mature democracy' that Colombia fails to meet. A 
'mature democracy' is one in which the behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional 
framework constrain all actors from seeking an alternative, non-democratic form of 
government. The above definition of 'mature democracy' is a modification of Linz's and 
Stepan's work on democratic transition and consolidation. It is generally accepted that an 
authoritarian regime will pass through three stages before it can be called fully 
democratic. The stages are liberalization, transition, and consolidation. However, a 
fourth stage should be added to the process of transition: that of a mature democracy. 
Table 1.1 displays the four stages and the conditions that must be met before Colombia 
can be called a mature democracy. 
Table 1. 1. Stages of Democratization 
Liberalization Transition Consolidation Mature Democracy 
RefonnlBreak Agreement on Procedures Rules of the Game Behavioral 
Government de Facto Mass Participation Attitudinal 
Authority Institutions Constitutional 
State de Jure power 
.. Source: Author, adapted from Juan J. Lmz and Alfred Stepan, Prohlems of DemocratIc TranSItIOn and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America. and Post Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), p. 3-6. 
The four conditions - liberalization, transition, consolidation, and mature 
democracy - do not necessarily occur in a sequential fashion, but rather may occur in a 
simultaneous manner, or overlap. For instance, in Colombia while the political elites 
were negotiating with the ruling Military Junta in 1957 (liberalization), the political 
parties were working on the establishment of the rules of the game (consolidation). 
These stages are ideal types, and some countries never reach mature democracy. 
6 
However it is the behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional ideals that secure the survival 
of democratic regimes and leave them less vulnerable to breakdown. 
Breakdown usually occurs when an unsolvable structural or non-structural 
problem hinders a democratic regime from providing effective, efficacious and legitimate 
government. A structural problem refers to formational issues that deal with the 
procedural approach to the democratic formula. For example, the Colombian case is one 
in which a democracy, based on a two-party system, excludes other political actors. A 
non-structural problem deals with questions of relationship among the actors. In 
Colombia, the role played by the political elites and the guerrillas or the interaction 
between the cartels and the guerrillas are good examples of non-structural problems. 
These structural and non-structural problems obstruct the government's ability to exercise 
its authority by limiting its effectiveness, efficacy, and at times challenging its legitimacy. 
Figure 1.1 on the next page depicts the sequence of events in Colombian history 
associated with the country's perpetual search for democratic consolidation. The figure 
identifies the three actors that will be discussed in this thesis - political institutions, the 
military, and the guerrillas. These actors could be loyal to the regime; believing that the 
current system of government is legitimate, as in the case of the Colombian military. The 
actors could also be disloyal to the government - rejecting the political formula, as in the 
case of the guerrillas. Or, they could be semi-loyal to the regime - agreeing with the 
system but rejecting the tactics, as in the case of political parties like Union Patriotica 
[Patriotic Union] and Accion Democnitica M- J 9 [Democratic Action M -19V 2 
12 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 
7 
r--------------------------------------------- ------
Colombia's lack of democratic consolidation is due in part to the negative impact that the 
elite pact known as the National Front (NF) had on Colombian society, which is an 
indicator of a structural problem. That lack of consolidation is also due to the current 
guerrilla problem and role of the military, a non-structural problem. Each of these actors 
will be discussed in separate chapters, and exemplify an unsolved structural or non-
structural problem in Colombia today, which hinders the development of behavioral, 
attitudinal and constitutional democratization. 
Liberalization 
ReformlBreak 





de Facto Authority/de 











Structural: No new National Front 
Non-Structural: 




- Political Violence 
- Power Vacuum 




Figure 1.1. Colombia's Democratic Transition (1957-1998) 
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Linz argues that a government's inability to solve structural or non-structural 
problems can lead to a crisis, which has three possible outcomes: 1) breakdown - the 
destabilization or overthrow of democracy; 2) transfer of power - the democratic 
leadership turns over power; or 3) reequilibration - the continued existence of democratic 
principles at the same or higher level. 13 In Colombia, a crisis Qccurred during the 
government of Ernesto Samper (1994-98). The government's loss of efficacy, efficiency, 
and legitimacy created a power vacuum in Colombia, which lasted until the completion 
of his term in August of 1998. The reequilibration period may have started with the 
election of Andres Pastrana in June of 1998. However, it is too early to tell what impact 
the Pastrana government will have in solving Colombia's structural and non-structural 
problems, or how these will affect the new president's decision making process. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND IMPORTANCE 
This thesis is a single case study on the state of democracy in Colombia. It 
assesses Colombia's current democratization process and the prospect for democracy, 
applying the framework presented by Linz and Stepan. The country's incomplete 
consolidation makes it a risk-prone democratic regime. As long as political society fails 
to move towards full democratization, Colombian democracy will continue to seek 
reequilibration without ever consolidating. 
The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, it seeks to explain Colombia's 
incomplete consolidation and its potential for democratic breakdown. The thesis focuses 
on how the political institutions, the military, and the guerrillas adapt and adjust to 
13 Juan J. Linz, pp. 50-87. 
9 
overcome the political challenges facing Colombia. Second, it attempts to review U.S. 
policy, and to make recommendations that would assist the Colombian government in 
stabilizing the democratic process in the country. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
In Chapter II, the thesis examines the extent to which the Liberal and 
Conservative parties, and the National Front obstructed the development of political 
institutions in Colombia. That is, it evaluates how this closed two-party system impeded 
democratic consolidation. What was the impact of the National Front on democracy? 
What elements of this type of political arrangement contribute to breakdown? The 
chapter argues that Colombia's troubles with democratization began with the two-party 
system, deepened with the creation of the National Front, and finally reached a crisis 
point with the abolishment of the National Front. 
Chapter III examines the role of the Colombian military. It explores current civil-
military relations to determine whether or not the military has been a positive force in the 
democratization of the country. This chapter evaluates what influences have shaped the 
military, which has remained loyal to the democratic way of life. 
Chapter IV considers the role played by the guerrillas in Colombian society. The 
chapter examines the negative impact of over forty years of internal conflict on 
democratization. Why has part of this disloyal opposition renounced disloyalty and 
joined the democratic process? Why have others chosen to remain outside the democratic 
process? The chapter analyzes two relatively new phenomena: the narco-guerrilla 
connection and the role of para-military units in Colombian society. 
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Finally, Chapter V offers some conclusions on the current status of democracy in 
Colombia. How is the Pastrana administration preparing to deal with the immense 
problems facing the nation? President Pastrana is enjoying an unprecedented level of 
high credibility and legitimacy, but he must coordinate a coherent national security 
strategy before the honeymoon is over. The thesis will also examine the implications of a . 
non-democratic Colombia in the region. How would the success of guerrilla forces and 
drug cartels influence the democratic development ,of countries such as Venezuela, Peru, 
Bolivia and Ecuador? This chapter also looks at the role the United States can play in 
halting the downward spiral in which the Colombian nation finds itself. How can the 
U.S. avoid becoming an obstacle in the democratization process? The thesis argues this 
can be accomplished by helping to strengthen the judicial and legislative branches of 
government and sponsoring political institution building. 
F. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
There exists considerable research on democratic transition and consolidation. 
The multiplicity of studies and approaches makes it difficult to arrive at a consensus. 
However, most of the studies focus on transition and consolidation, with few considering 
full democratization. When democratization is measured by behavioral, attitudinal, and 
constitutional elements found in a society, it then becomes more difficult to call a country 
democratic. Those three factors require that no significant actor, within the country's 
social, political, or economic elite, believe that any other form of government is suitable 
II 
for their society.14 The question becomes, what kind of democracy - liberal, procedural, 
electoral - that the United States policy should support. Another limitation of this study 
is its lack of statistical data, other than that found in the literature, which would add 
empirical depth of the study. 
14 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe. South America. and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 
6. 
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II. POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Colombia has maintained the second longest uninterrupted democratic political 
process in Latin America. Except for a few months in the 19th century and four years in 
the 20th , this nation has always enjoyed some form of participatory govemment. 15 Yet, 
Colombian democracy historically has been under siege. As stated by Tina Rosenberg in 
her work Children of Cain, "[v ]iewed from the outside Colombia today seems like a true 
democracy: no military coups since 1953; two parties competing for the presidency; 
peaceful transition between parties. But the political system looks different from 
within."16 It is a democracy plagued by violence, cIientelism, and corruption, which even 
now, at the end of the 20th century, threatens the stability of the nation. Two civil wars 
have been fought in the country, La Guerra de los Mil Dias (1899-1902) and La 
Violencia (1946-1950). The root cause for these conflicts was political - in the former 
Liberal revolts; and in the latter, Liberal insurgency and resistance. These civil wars are 
just two examples of Colombia's violent political and cultural history. Since the late 
1800s until the present, this nation's democracy has been punctuated by periods of 
limited participation, repression, and violence. 
For the purpose of this chapter, a regime is considered democratic if it meets the 
"minimum procedural" criteria established by Dahl, which was discussed, in Chapter I. 
IS Jorge P. Osterling, p.xvi. 
16 Tina Rosenberg, Children of Cain: Violence and the Violent in Latin America (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1992), p. 42. 
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In tenns of institutions and processes, Colombia meets these minimal standards, in that it 
is a stable functioning democracy, governed by civilian presidents, elected by universal 
suffrage, with clearly defined civilian rule and civilian authority over the nation's 
military. 17 
However, due to Colombia's powerful and exclusive political institutions and the 
violence that plagues society, full democratization has yet to occur. 
This chapter argues that Colombia's two-party system, with elections that until 
recently were controlled by a bureaucratic apparatus, with chronic fraud at the ballot box, 
and endemic violence, is hardly democratic. Furthermore, it argues that the failure of 
successive regimes, whether Liberal, Conservative or authoritarian, to consolidate the 
state, has significantly contributed to the nation's democratic decline. 
B. LIMITED DEMOCRATIC TRADITION 
Some kind of Conservative or Liberal political party has been central to 
Colombia's political life for at least a century. In fact, the Liberal and Conservative 
political elites have been the central organizing mechanism of politics in Colombia since 
the emergence of the nation in the late nineteen-century. 
On the one hand, the Conservatives show a marked preference for a social and 
political order in which tradition and religion play paramount roles. IS Those belonging to 
this group could be seen as espousing order and hierarchy. This party, which is 
17 Jorge P. Osterling, p. ix. 
18 Robert H. Dix, Colomhia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1967), p. 233. 
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traditionally middle-class and rural in orientation, advocates the status quo as it emerged 
from the colonial period. On the other hand, the Liberals are guided by a sense of reason. 
They led in the promotion of secular and public education and regard change as 
desirable. They stress liberty and popular rule under a decentralized government. The 
Liberals do well with urbanites, and seek to do away with the remnants of social and 
economic dichotomy inherited from a colonial past. However, the Colombian political 
party scene is complicated, even today, by the fact that many powerful landowners are 
Liberals and many merchants and intellectuals are Conservatives. This political 
crossover breaks with the traditional Latin American Conservative-Liberal division. 19 
The crossover occurs because the two parties have very similar institutional platforms and 
the differences between them were narrowed when the National Front was established. 
If Robert D. Putnam is correct that "institutions shape politics,,,20 then the 
National Front is the structure that shaped Colombian political behavior from 1958 until 
1974, when it was formally terminated, and beyond. The National Front, as an 
institution, was instrumental in limiting democratic development in Colombian politics. 
Its platform called for the alternation of power between the two political parties, and 
parity in the assignment of public service employment and appointments to the executive, 
legislative, and judicial bodies of government. This arrangement effectively reduced and 
even negated the need for competition between the two political parties, because they 
were guaranteed equal power in the administration of the nation. In essence, the National 
19 Ibid., pp. 235-245. 
20 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), p. 7. 
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Front divided the spoils of office among the political ruling class at the exclusion of other 
political players. 
Complicating the country's political landscape is that fact that this two-party 
system, which has been in existence since approximately 1850, enjoys strong attachments 
and loyalties from its followers. The Conservatives today seem to have significant 
political advantage given that the clergy and the military, two powerful allies, seem to 
have developed a strong affinity for this party. Historically, however, the political 
relationship between Colombia's Liberal and Conservative factions has been marked by 
periods of violent confrontation, which has paved the way for the paternalistic and 
clientelistic political relations that the country experiences today. 
This two-party dominance of the Colombian political scene, according to Ronald 
P. Archer, has the greatest degree of institutional continuity in Latin America. This is 
largely due to the creation of the National Front (NF) in January 1958. Robert H. Dix 
argued, thirty-one years ago, that the combination of "patronage mobilization and 
traditional parties with weak organizational and representatorial structures is hardly 
unusual in Latin America."21 
What are unusual and unique characteristics of the Colombian political experience 
are the roles and levels of institutionalization achieved by the political parties as a 
consequence of the National Front. The institutionalization of the National Front is the 
genesis of the current unsolved structural challenges in the Colombian political 
21 Ibid., p. 191. 
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landscape. For, in sum and substance, the National Front restricted the participation of 
any other political actor that sought to challenge the two traditional political powers. 
C. THE NATIONAL FRONT: 1958-1974 AND BEYOND 
As early as 1869, agreements existed between the liberal and conservative 
political elite in which the two agreed to cooperate in adopting policies that assured the 
consolidation of democratic institutions. However, John Higley and Richard Gunther 
state that this type of elite settlement, which they tenn elite pact, only helps to stabilize 
the political environment, but does not produce the conditions for the establishment of 
consolidated democratic regimes.22 In the Colombian case the elite pact translated into 
limited political democracy, since its complexity excluded the mass following of the 
respective parties and neglected the consolidation of the state. The creation of the 
National Front hindered the development of any political challenge posed by refonnists; 
that is, anned revolution was the sole path available to challenge the political institution 
which catered to the Conservative and Liberal political elite. As Jonathan Hartlyn 
observed in his excellent work, The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia, "[u]nderlying 
the fonnation of guerrilla movements in Colombia in each decade was a sense of social 
justice and political blockage as a consequence of the National Front regime.'>23 
This elite pact responded to two threats in the Colombian political landscape of 
1956: first, to the threat of mass mobilization, over which the elites had lost control and 
had turned to mass violence. Second, to the threat posed by the military government of 
22 John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern 
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 20. 
23 Jonathan Hartlyn, The Politics o/Coalition Rule in Colombia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), p. 191. 
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General Rojas Pinillas as it attempted to displace the political parties and perpetuate an 
authoritarian regime. 24 The National Front, writes Robert H. Dix, "institutionalized the 
coalition of the nation's two traditional warring political parties.,,2s Laureano Gomez, 
one of the principal originators of the National Front, writes in Ei Frente Nacionai that 
"the National Front was born because the greatest enemy of a conservative is not a liberal 
(nor vice versa) but a dictator.,,26 Clearly, the creation of the National Front was a 
stopgap measure used to curtail the political viole!lce that tore the nation apart during the 
period of "La Vioiencia," from 1948 to 1958. This period that commenced with the 
assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan on 9 April 1948 was the most violent in Colombia's 
history. A strange mixture of political and social uprising exploded into a decade of 
terror in which the final tally was 200,000 dead.27 
The priority for the National Front was to create political peace and establish 
some semblance of constitutional order. This, unfortunately, was accomplished at the 
expense of democratic, economic, and social development. Major General Jose Ibanez 
Sanchez wrote that the National Front was not fully democratic, because it excluded any 
political participation beyond the two traditional parties. This bipartisan monopoly 
24 John A. Peeler, p. 95. 
25 Robert H. Dix, p. vii. 
26 Laureano Gomez, El Frente Nacional: Sintesi.l' Dictarial e Hi.ltoria (Bogota: Ediciones Laguram, 1958), 
p. 16, cited in Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1967), p. 164. 
27 Jonathan Hartlyn, p. 3. 
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weakened the control of the state and facilitated the development of clientilism and 
corruption.28 
In essence, what the National Front provided was a vehicle through which the 
political elite could exercise dominance over the social and economic process, promoting 
their own interests while avoiding social unrest. The National Front assured the ruling 
regime a too loyal opposition.29 By design, the National Front obviated political struggle 
in Colombia, attempted to educate Colombians in the art of political compromise, and 
created an atmosphere for acceptance of a legitimate opposition.30 However, this social 
experiment created a system of government that represented the interests of the elites in 
the Conservative and Liberal factions. Third actors in the political process could only get 
on the official party list under the sponsorship of the two main parties. It also created a 
governrnent with only limited power to influence anyone, because tenuous and fragile 
coalitions restricted the controlling faction's ability to govern. 
If "institutions are shaped by history,,,31 then the National Front was no exception. 
Factionalism, prevalent in Colombian political culture, weakened the National Front's 
ability to function. Furthermore, the National Front fell short of accomplishing an 
ambitious economic reform plan centered on stability, growth and diversification, and 
regional development. In general, the National Front did little to develop channels for the 
28 MAJGEN Jose Robert Ibanez Sanchez, Democracia. Securidad y Fuerza Publica: Panorama 
Conceptual Historico y Legal de Colombia en el Contexto Latinoamericano (Bogota: Academia 
Colombiana de Historia, 1994) p. 209. 
29 Juan 1. Linz describes the loyal opposition as being those political forces willing to support the 'rules of 
the game.' For a more detailed explanation see Linz, 1978, p. 36. 
30 Robert H. Dix, p. 131. 
31 Robert D. Putnam, p. 8. 
19 
expression of popular aspirations and to incorporate other social groups into positions of 
influence and leadership. The dismantling of the institution in 1974 paved the way for 
other political actors to enter the Colombian political scene. Nonetheless, entrenched 
party loyalties and the clientelistic nature of Colombian politics hampered the evolvement 
of other political alternatives. 
The collapse of the National Front in 1974 spurred competition among the 
political actors. Yet, because no single political party has been able or willing to 
capitalize on the mobilization of the middle class, this sector of society remains 
disconnected from the political process. This middle-class disconnect can be attributed to 
three factors: 1) lack of organizational efforts from new political parties; 2) massive 
migration from rural to urban centers; and 3) decrease in the level of political 
participation.32 Even today, twenty-four years after the demise of the National Front, a 
strong argument could be made that even though the power sharing agreement between 
the political parties is extinct, the alternation of political power between Conservatives 
and Liberals remains in place. Table 2.1 below, which looks at elected presidents from 
1974 to the present, demonstrates that even after 1974, the power sharing arrangement 
instituted between the two main political actors is the standard outcome of elections. 
32Alberto J. Mejia, "The Impact of U.S. De-Certification on Colombian Democracy," (Master's Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 1996). p. 61. 
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Table 2.1. Colombia's Elected Presidents and Ruling Party, 1974-98 
Year Elected Presidents and Ruling Party 
1974-78 Alfonso Lopez Michelsen (Liberal) 
1978-82 Julio Cesar Turbay (Liberal) 
1982-86 Belisario Betancur (Conservative) 
1986-90 Virgilio Barco (Liberal) 
1990-94 Cesar Gaviria Trujillo (Liberal) 
1994-98 Emesto Samper (Liberal) 
1998- Present Andres Pastrana (Conservative) 
Dismantling the National Front revealed the growing rift between the issues and 
agendas of the political actors and the demands, concerns, and expectations of the 
country's populace.33 The issues that the political elites have been unable to resolve are 
institutionalized violence, rampant corruption in government, and the drug Mafia. 
Furthermore, the removal of the National Front created an institutional void, in terms of 
electorate, education, and choice. Until this day, no other institution has filled that void. 
However, in 1978, when Colombia began to run distinct congressional and presidential 
elections, the influence of the National Front over the nation's politics began to recede. 
Three factors in Colombia's political institutions contribute to the structural 
problem found in the country's political society: 1) entrenched party loyalties; 2) lack of 
voter education by the political elite; and 3) the inability of third parties to sustain growth 
in a closed system. These three factors permitted by Colombia's political elite, as a direct 
consequence of a pacted two-party political system, do not contribute to democratic 
consolidation and do facilitate breakdown. Because party loyalists tend to be staunch 
defenders of the party platform, uneducated voters have a tendency to practice 
electoralism, and a third party option is not viable. 
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Furthermore, as with most Latin American nations, interpersonal relations are stil1 
more important than formal political rules to the functioning of society. Consequently, 
Colombian politics are riddled with strong patron-client relations. Given that "the 
primary goal of a patronage network is to provide benefits to an electoral fol1owing,"34 
party leadership in Colombia remains personalistic. That is, people identify with a strong 
national leader who has supporters in their particular region. Hegemony is established by 
attacking the opposition's power base and rewarding supporters. Major General Jose 
Robert Ibanez Sanchez in Democracia, Securidad y Fuerza Publica, argues that the 
tendency to exercise political power in a personalistic fashion is embedded in the 
caudillista [strong man] traditions found throughout Latin America. 35 However, a more 
compelling argument is that this personalistic style of democracy is the result of the 
adoption of liberal democratic ideology and theory by a country whose historical, 
political, social, and economic reality did not permit the proper implementation or 
development of the model. In short, democracy arrived too quickly. 
D. DEMOCRACY ... TOO FAST, TOO SOON 
Francisco E. Thoumi argues in Economia, Politica y Narcotrafico that recent 
Colombian history is marked by the struggle between the old society and the formation of 
a new one.36 Colombia's colonial heritage, at the time of adoption of liberal democratic 
tenets, was one of strict hierarchical social structure, rule by legalistic decree and 
33 Ibid., p. 62. 
34 Ronal P. Archer, p. 187. 
3S MGEN Jose Robert Ibanez Sanchez, p. 64. 
36 Francisco E. Thoumi, Economia, Politica y Narcotrafico (Bogota: TIM Editores, 1994), p. 73. 
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Catholicism, which could not sustain the liberal Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ideals of 
rational administration. This nation was and is today, a Spanish culture in which the 
bonds of even extended family unity (compadres, primos y amigotes) [godfather, cousins, 
and intimate friends] are more important than individual accomplishment found in liberal 
ideology. Additionally, the work ethic in Spanish culture is significantly different from 
the Anglo-Saxon Protestant work ethic. In Spanish culture, the immediate group is 
important, and bonding is a requirement. In negotiations, the process is more important 
than closing a deal. In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture is marked by 
individual and impersonal interaction and the closing of the deal is the goal. 37 
Politically, Colombia struggled because the dream of General Simon Bolivar, that 
of creating and unifying a Gran Colombia, vanished. This disintegration of the nation led 
to the fragmentation of the state and its inability to fortify democratic rule. In the context 
of a fragmented and weak state, Colombia's political society lacked the cohesion 
necessary to consolidate any liberal democratic gains. Lawrence Boudon and others 
argued that "Colombia historically has suffered the consequences of having a weak state, 
one that has been unable either to establish its legal authority and legitimacy throughout 
the entire national territory or to gain sufficient autonomy from sectoral interest.,,38 The 
disunity among the political elite manifested itself in social conflict. 
Socially and economically, the great hacendados [landowner] and urban elite 
contended for the acquisition of personal wealth and power. On the one hand, the great 
37 Carlos Fuentes, Latin America: At War With The Past (Toronto: CBC Enterprises, 1985), pp. 9-20. 
38 Lawrence Boudon, "Guerrilla and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process," 
Journal of Latin American Studies 28 (May 1996): p. 288. 
23 
latifundistas [estate owner] or hacendados fought to protect and preserve their regional 
powers and traditional economic way of life. On the other hand, the urban elite wanted to 
move the country rapidly into an era of industrialization and thus centralize power in the 
greater metropolitan areas. Table 2.2 highlights the rapidity with which the shift occurred 
in the country wrought by rapid modernization. In less than twenty years, Colombian 
society, moved from being rural-based to urban-based due to the swift pace of 
modernization caused the by rapid industrial growth. However, this rapid 
industrialization growth was based on import substitution industrialization (lSI), which 
made economic growth increasingly dependent on direct foreign market fluctuations. 
Table 2.2. Colombian Economic Distribution (% by Sector) 
Year Agriculture Industry Service Sector 
1960 50.1 19.5 30.4 
1980 34.3 23.5 42.2 
1987 20.7 28.5 50.8 
Source: Francisco Thoumi, Economia, Politica), Narcotrafico (Santa Fe de Bogota: TIM Editores, 
1994) pp.7-8; and Colombia: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1990) p. 156. 
The National Front did usher in a period of economic growth as showed in Table 
2.3, especially during the 1967-1972 period. However, this economic growth allowed the 
political elites to forego making fundamental institutional changes that would have 
assisted in strengthening democratic institutions. Furthermore, other market and 
economic factors such as, a strong coffee market could have influenced the 6.03 percent 
annual growth in Gross Domestic Product during this period. 
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, . Source: FrancIsco Thouml, EeonomlO, Poiztlea y Nareotrajieo, 
Santa Fe de Bogota: TIM Editores, 1994, p.13-15. 
Another indicator of the impact of rapid modernization on the Colombian social 
fabric was the improvement in the area of public education. Table 2.4 reveals over a 50 
percent drop in the country's illiteracy rate in just twenty years. It was impossible for 
Colombia's socioeconomic structure to absorb the influx of the rising middle class, 
because the economic and political elites reaped most of the benefits. 
Table 2.4. Colombian Educational Indicators (%) 
Year Illiteracy Rate High School Graduates University Graduates 
1960 27.1 11.9 01.8 
1980 12.2 44.0 10.6 
, . Source: FrancIsco Thouml, EeonomlO, Po/mea y Nareotrajieo, Santa Fe de Bogota: TIM Edltores, 1994, 
p.9. 
Quality of life indicators are also a strong indicator of Colombia's rapid 
modernization and are summarized in Table 2.5. It was extremely difficult for the 
government to provide society with the minimum services needed to support its 
development. Rapid modernization resulted in the disenfranchisement of a whole sector 
of Colombian society. 
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Quality of Life Indicators (% of service to rural sector) 
---,,--~-----, 
Water Electricity Sewage 
Table 2.5. 
Year 
1951 28.8 25.8 32.4 
1985 ---=::-:::~-:---::~--t 69.7 (89.8)* 78.2 (95.0) 77.0 (93.6) 
* Availability of services for urban areas. 
Source: Francisco Thoumi, Economia. Politica y Narcotrafico, Santa Fe de Bogota: TIM Editores, 1994, 
p.8. 
From all the previous data, it is possible to sunnise that Colombia's rapid rate of 
modernization did not facilitate the entrenchment of democratization. In fact, the early 
adaptation of liberal democratic principles, without modifying them to suit their own 
developmental reality, aided in the development of a dysfunctional democracy. That is 
why authors like Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley argued, in 1992, that 
these factors often lead to nothing more than the establishment of pseudo democracies. 
Such democracies are characterized by political and economic elite domination, 
exploitation of the popular class and outright exclusion of certain political options.39 Juan 
Gabriel Tokatlian supports this analysis in a more recent examination of democracy in 
Colombia. He concluded that Colombia's democracy is a non-liberal democracy -
characterized by the lack of the rule of law, effective safeguards against the violation of 
fundamental rights, with no strict separation of powers, and on the border of collapse.4o 
Colombia's rapid modernization served to disrupt the social and political order, 
pitting the rural and urban elite in violent confrontation, and exhausting the resources of 
the state. Huntington discussed this 'modernization-violence' phenomenon some thirty 
39 Higley and Gunther, p. 2. 
40 Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Colombia: Una Democracia I1iberal?" £1 Tiempo, 21 July 1998, sec. 1 A, p. 
17A. 
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years ago. He argued that rapid modernization tends to that produces violence and 
political disorder.41 In Colombia, the political institutions developed under the National 
Front were overwhelmed by the demands of rapid modernization. 
E. DEMOCRATIC DEGRADATION 
One may wonder whether there is or has ever been democracy in Colombia. Jorge 
P. Osterling quotes the late Jaime Bateman (founder of the guerrilla group M-19) as 
stating that 
it is paradoxical, brutally paradoxical that we should have to opt for war -
the most authoritarian and least democratic procedure - in order to impose 
political pluralism and democracy.42 
By the end of the 1970s, Colombia's political house was in shambles. The 
National Front, now a defunct institution, had created a political system that favored 
compromise over intrepid action. Linz cautioned that "in a democracy, leaders depend, 
particularly in a crisis, on the support of party organizations rather than on the 
electorate."43 However, in Colombia, his caution had been disregarded in favor of a 
system that catered to a clientelistic relationship between the electorate and the political 
actors. Colombia faced what Samuel Huntington called political decay; a situation in 
which there is 
an actual decline in the ability of the government to deal with change 
through the failure of institutions such as parties to provide effective links 
between the elites and the increasingly politicized masses. Since the 
41 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 
pp.39-47. 
42 Jorge P. Osterling, p. xv. 
43 Juan 1. Linz, p. 53. 
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society lacks law, authority, cohesion, discipline, and consensus .. .in short, 
political institutions are weak and social forces strong.44 
Legitimacy, as defined by Linz "is the belief that in spite of the shortcomings and 
failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be 
established, and they therefore demand obedience.'>45 Colombia has had several 
governments of questionable legitimacy; such as, the government of General Rojas 
Pinillas (1953-1957) and the Military Junta (1957-1958). More recently the question of 
legitimacy manifested itself most strongly in the Ernesto Samper government (1994-
1998). No Colombian presidency has been more under siege. The Samper government 
faced· a serious crisis of legitimacy stemming from continuous guerrilla activity and the 
alleged financial contributions from the cartels to Samper's political campaign. The 
government's concern with the issue of legitimacy was so compelling that President 
Samper, during his 1994 inaugural address, recognized the pressing need to regain the 
state's legitimate monopoly over its own armed forces. The Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias Colombianas (FARC) [Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces] used 
the allegation to openly challenge the legitimacy of the Samper regime and his 
commitments to the narcotraffickers who financed his presidential campaign. Yadira 
Ferrer maintained that the FARC's plan to block elections is a "clear indication of the 
guerrilla's rejection of the peace initiatives proposed by President Samper, since F ARC 
considers his government illegitimate.'>46 
44 Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics 27 (April 1965): 
386-430. 
45 Juan J. Linz, p. 16. 
46 Yadira Ferrer, "Guerrillas Threaten to Disrupt Colombia's Elections," The Black World News; available 
from http://www.IPS. Global Info; Internet; accessed 8 August 1997. 
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Clearly, the political violence created by several groups of guerrilla forces 
operating in Colombia serves, as Linz would argue, as strong indicators of and 
contributing factors to democratic breakdown. 
Effectiveness, another element of democracy according to Linz, is seen as the 
capacity of a government to implement the policies formulated and to achieve the desired 
results.47 In a recent discussion group at the Naval Postgraduate School on 19 February 
1998, Carlos Sereceres argued that the Colombian government not only lacks a national 
campaign strategy, but also lacks the central authority and national leadership to 
implement such a strategy, if one existed. Others like Jonathan Hartlyn and Lawrence 
Bouden posit that Colombia has traditionally lacked the ability to gain sufficient authority 
and legitimacy to implement government policy as a consequence of weak state cohesion. 
The Samper regime has failed to seek the consolidation of the state and develop the tools 
to implement Bogota's policies. 
The Samper government was also hindered by the continual turnover in the 
Executive Cabinet, highlighted with the 1997 resignations of the Communication 
Minister and the Minister for Mines and Energy, both under allegations of wrongdoing. 
Other resignations came from the Ambassador to Britain, after she accused the Samper 
regime of a loss of credibility, and from the Foreign Minister. These incidents, as well as 
the 1996 firing of the Army Chief of Staff for the Colombian Army and serious 
accusations of impropriety, can all be seen as indicators of the regime's lack of 
effectiveness. General Ricardos Emilio Cinfuentes' resignation was an especially severe 
47 Juan J. Linz, p. 72. 
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blow to the administration, for this officer, highly regarded within the Colombian military 
establishment, is on record as stating that his conscience, his principles, and his 
convictions do not permit him to support the president of the republic.48 These situations 
caused the Samper administration to focus on tangential problems rather than on the 
agenda items of the government. 
Another yard stick used by Linz to measure the impact of a political system is 
efficacy: 
the capacity of a regime to find solutions to the basic problems facing any 
political system that are perceived as more satisfactory than unsatisfactory 
by aware citizens.49 
In the area of efficacy, the analysis of past Colombian regimes also reveals 
shortcomings. The nation continues to be in a state of virtual siege, which has lasted on 
and off for more than sixty years. The traditional use of violence to accomplish political 
goals seems imbedded in the political culture. Henry Raymont writes that "the policy of 
supporting the military when the government and civilian society are dangerously weak -
in a country devastated by violent conflict - merely stimulates militarism and war."so 
F. CONCLUSION 
Colombian political institutions have hindered, rather than promoted, 
democratization of the nation. The current conflict is rooted in Colombia's political past, 
which pits the nation against the consequences of rapid modernization. According to 
48 Pablo Rodriquez, "Samper Crisis Widens, Top General Resigns, State of Emergency Extended," Agence 
France Presse; LEXISfNEXIS [database on line]; accessed 11 September 1997. 
49 Juan J. Linz, p. 21. 
so Henry Raymont, p. 3. 
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Archer, "The traditional parties are still divided and weakly organized and have shown 
little capacity to react to the changes in the political environment.,,51 Colombia's two-
party system is a reflection of the country's hierarchical social pattern; they provide a 
means of top-down control rather than effective political expression, which ultimately 
inhibits the consolidation of democracy. 52 The National Front served to institutionalize 
and consolidate the power of the political and economic elite. Although it did serve to 
usher in a political period relatively free from violence, its exclusionary nature sowed the 
seeds of current instability. 
Colombia's democratic survival depends on its political elite consolidating the 
state and restructuring an exclusionary two-party system to constrict the social-political 
arena in which the disloyal opposition operates. This social-political fissure, which the 
Colombian disloyal opposition exploits, is the gap that exists between what civil society 
expects the government to deliver and that which the government provides. In order to 
fully consolidate democracy, Colombia must close the gap between those disenfranchised 
sectors of civil society and the political elite. 
Putnam states that "good democratic government not only considers the demands 
of its citizenry (that is, is responsive), but also acts efficaciously upon these demands 
(that is, is effective).,,53 If this is true, then the current crisis condemns the process of 
democratic consolidation in Colombia to failure unless significant structural and non-
structural modifications are carried out. Thus, until an equitable debate and dialogue are 
51 Ronald P. Archer, p. 199. 
52 Robert H. Dix, p. 222. 
53 Putnam, p. 63. 
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established between the warring parties, one which addresses the political, social, and 
economic structural imbalances, the establishment of a cohesive democracy is unfeasible. 
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III. THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
"En Colombia, que e1J tierra de la1J C01J41J 1Jingulare1J, 
dan 14 paz los militares y los civiles dan querra." 
Gregorio Gomez, Sociologia Politica Colombiana 
Colombian columnist Clara Nieto Ponce de Leon, writing in El Espectador, 
points out that "the military do not need a coup in order to exercise power; the 
government - more debilitated than ever - will give them free rein.,,54 The government 
denies giving the military forces a free rein and has in fact reasserted its leadership in the 
handling of officers disgruntled over concessions to guerrilla groups in the peace process. 
There is no doubt that the armed forces enjoy the support of both the business and 
political sectors in the war to eradicate guerrilla violence and drug traffic. But, after four 
decades of fighting guerrillas, the armed forces are still in search of a national and 
military strategy, developed by the nation's civil and political leadership, which will 
bring a peaceful solution to the conflict. 
This chapter will explore the current state of civil-military relations in Colombia. 
Its primary argument is that civil-military relations in Colombia have eroded sufficiently 
to be a source of concern to the political and military leadership of the nation, further 
exacerbating Colombia's delicate democratic situation. Secondly, as the internal security 
of the country becomes more tenuous, the military is gaining more prerogatives55 as it 
focuses on internal security issues. The focusing of the military on internal roles and 
54 Henry Raymont, p. 4. 
55 In essence, the military is expanding its sphere of interest and influence in the Colombian political and 
civilian landscape. For a more comprehensive explanation on this issue see Alfred Stepan, Rethinking 
Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) Chap. 7. 
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mission only precipitates the politicization of the military. Linz cautions against 
democratic governments losing control over their armed forces through politicization. 
Finally, it examines whether or not the continuation of the current level of political and 
criminal violence in the country is the catalyst that will drive the armed forces into a 
higher state ofpoliticization - a dangerous proposition for democracy. 
The chapter will focus on how the roles played by the National Front, the political 
regime, U.S. military aid, and budgetary restrictions have contributed to heightening the 
tension between civilian and military actors in the Colombian political scene. It will also 
examine other significant factors, such as the continuous decay of the country's political 
elite, the military's lackluster performance against the guerrilla threat, and the role played 
by the United States as an external actor. It will conclude with an appraisal of and 
recommendations for halting the deterioration of civil-military relations in Colombia. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Colombian military overthrew a 
constitutionally chosen president on four occasions: 1830, 1854, 1900, and 1953. For 
Latin America, an area plagued by military coups and military junta types of government, 
this speaks highly of the Colombian armed forces and the control exercised by the 
political authorities over them. Costa Rica is the only country, of thirty-four in the 
region, that has not been ruled by an authoritarian regime. The Colombian anomaly 
could be a direct result of a "semiconscious policy by the Colombian upper class to keep 
the military in its place and prevent any challenge to civilian rule."s6 Today, civil-
military relations in Colombia, although shifting negatively, have not reached the point 
56 Robert H. Dix, p. 295. 
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were they are in crisis and the military could be considered a threat to the democratic 
process. This chapter argues that in Colombia, the ,military remains loyal and could be a 
positive force in the full democratization of the country. 
B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: AYER YHOY 
Although it is possible to analyze civil-military relations in Colombia using the 
Linz parameters of effectiveness and efficacy, Alfred Stepan provides an even better 
framework. In his work, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, 
Stepan establishes a matrix of eleven prerogatives that serve as excellent indicators of 
civil-military relations in any country. The lower the military scores on these 
prerogatives, the greater the civilian control. The higher the military prerogatives, the 
lower the civilian control.57 Linz, Stepan, Huntington, and others seem to agree that as 
civilian control of the military diminishes, so do the prospects to establish full 
democracy. 
Table 3.1 depicts how civil-military relations have evolved in Colombia. The 
periods represented were chosen because they are significant in Colombian political 
history and they impact civil-military relations. These periods are - the Gen. Gustavo 
Rojas Pinilla and Military Junta regime (1953-1958); the 1958 to 1974 era of the National 
Front; the implementation of the 1991 Constitution and the establishment ofa Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) in the same year; and the 1998 election of President Andres Pastrana. 
57 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), Chapter 7. 
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Table 3.1. Military Prerogatives: The Colombian Case 
Prerogatives 1953- 1958- 1991 1998 
1957 1974 
1. Constitutionally sanctioned 
independent military in political High Moderate Low Low 
system 
2. Military relationship to the Chief High Moderate Low Low Executive 
3. Coordination of Defense Sector High High Moderate Low 
4. Active-duty participation in the High Moderate Moderate Low 
Cabinet 
5. Role of Legislature High High Moderate Moderate 
6. Role of senior career civil servants or High High Moderate Low 
civilian political appointees 
7. Role in intelligence NA High Moderate Moderate 
8. Role in police High High Moderate High 
9. Role in military promotions High High Moderate Moderate 
10. Role in state enterprises Moderate Moderate Low Moderate 
11. Role in legal system High Moderate Moderate Low 
. . .. Source: Author's assessment, based on Alfred Stepan, Rethmkmg MIlitary PolitiCS: Brazil and the 
Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 95-99. 
Military political power, in Colombia, reached its apogee with the government of 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957). As the political elite began to recognize Rojas 
Pinilla's attempt to build a political base through the military's use of a "puehlo-armed 
forces alliance," they felt politically threatened. 5K This single factor, the political elite's 
desire to protect their exclusive domain over government, led to the creation of the 
National Front and the gradual erosion of military prerogatives. As Table 3.1 shows, 
military prerogatives were high before the establishment of this elite pact, which is 
usually the case under an authoritarian regime. The establishment of the National Front, 
which also marked the return to civilian government, moderately reduced the military's 
$8 Gonzalo Sanchez, "The Violence: An interpretative Synthesis," in Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Pei'laranda 
and Gonzalo Sanchez eds., Violence in Colomhia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective 
(Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1992), p. 108. 
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prerogatives and its sphere of influence, thus commencing the return of the military to 
civilian control. Under the National Front, only six of the prerogatives were high, the rest 
were moderate. By 1991, none of the military prerogatives were high; eight are moderate 
and three are low. By 1998, four of those military prerogatives had moved from 
moderate to low, but two had moved in the opposite direction (one from low to moderate, 
and one from moderate to high). Although the prerogatives have not been weighted, one 
can argue that over the last forty-five years, military prerogatives in Colombia have 
declined substantially over time. The most problematic prerogative in 1998 is that of the 
military's role in law enforcement, which remains high. 
Four variables have shaped civil-military relations in Colombia today. First, as 
Table 3.1 depicts, was the creation of the National Front, which sought to protect the 
interest and power of the political elite. Second, was the impact of the 1991 Constitution. 
Third, was the establishment of a ministry of defense in 1991, which in time became 
responsible for coordinating the activities of the defense sector. The last variable was the 
attitudinal shift that occurred under the embattled Presidency of Ernesto Samper. 
C. THE MILITARY: TRANSITION OR TURMOIL 
While the Congress and the Executive have done little or nothing to address the 
current state of the nation, the Colombian Armed Forces have served the country's 
political forces faithfully and professionally for over 60 years. Even today, as Colombia 
is experiencing an undeclared internal war on two fronts - the guerrilla movements and 
the well organized drug cartels - the military remains supportive and loyal to the regime. 
37 
However, Richard Maulin in 1973 wrote that "[t]he professionalism of the 
military has not kept them out of politics. Rather it has given the armed forces a strategic 
political good - the capacity to influence fundamentally the outcome of internal political 
conflict which - the contenders seek to diminish.,,5'l This internal conflict is generated by 
the onslaught of violence, both political and criminal, produced by the guerilla forces, the 
drug cartels, and the paramilitary forces which seem to operate unchecked in the country. 
The guerrilla problem is a national security issue. Colombia's Left has often 
sought violent confrontation as a solution to social, economic and political problems. 
The Left has sought to weaken the state by undermining one of its basic functions, that of 
providing security.60 This course of action by the guerrillas required the state to address 
social, political, and economic disenchantment through political and military solutions. 
At the same time, the drug cartel and paramilitary problem is a conflict of internal 
security. This conflict will only be solved by strengthening the rule of law and those 
sectors of political society (the police and judiciary system) responsible for internal 
security. 
Nevertheless, in Colombia as in other countries in Latin America, the military 
plays an important role in the maintenance of internal order. This role of guardians of 
internal order has been one of several factors in the shift of civil-military relations in 
Sq Richard Maulin, Soldiers, Guerrillas and Politics in Colomhia (Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973), 
p.l13. 
1>0 Francisco E. Thoumi, p. xix. 
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Colombia, since, according to Wendy Hunter "strong civilian control is difficult to 
sustain when the armed forces are oriented mainly toward internal conflict. ,,61 
It is not uncommon in Latin American countries for the armed forces to be 
involved, to one degree or another, in arenas that do not necessarily deal with defense. 
Argentina and Chile provide good examples; in the former it is maritime transportation, 
while in the latter it is mining. Military involvement in non-defense activities enables 
them to generate funding to augment their operational budget. 
Table 3.2 reflects the degree to which the Colombian military is involved in the 
internal matters of the country. This high level of engagement diverts the military from 
its primary constitutional role. This involvement is one of the most significant factors 
detracting the military from achieving full operational control of the guerrilla situation. 
Table 3.2. Colombian Armed Forces Operational Commitments (per personnel) 
Sector Army Navy Air Force Total (%) 
Hydrocarbons 18,617 1,192 19,809 13.7 
Energy 4,283 72 4,355 3.0 
Communications 900 79 76 1,775 1.2 
Transportation 5,855 21 5,876 4.0 
Mining 1,920 300 2,220 1.5 
Aerospace 1,854 73 1,927 1.3 
Operations 60,394 10,509 2,058 72,961 50.5 
Service 28,140 2,807 5,189 36,136 25.0 
Total 121,963 14,959 7,417 144,339 100.0 
., Source: Jose LUIS Cadena Montenegro, "EficlencJa del Ejerclto de Colombia: Hlpotesls Econ6mlcas 
y Politicas" (Master's Thesis, Universidad de los Andes, 1998) p. 129. 
Half of the total force is dedicated to military operations, and half is dedicated to 
activities related to civil or political enterprises. Non-defense activities generate an 
61 Wendy Hunter, State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military's Role in Argentina. Brazil 
and Chile (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), p. vii. 
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independent source of funding, which is usually used to augment operational and 
maintenance budgets of each service. These funds are used by the services to alleviate 
the limitations caused by the reduction in funding at the national level. With half of the 
armed forces engaged in non-defense related activities, the government's ability to 
project and use force is diminished. Furthennore, these income-producing activities 
generate a degree of autonomy, which impacts the balance of civil-military relations. 
The dispersion and misuse of the armed forces, as an institution, contributes to the 
shift in civil-military relations in the country. Because the military is used to providing 
services that other institutions of the state should provide, governmental institutions are 
weakened and the consolidation of the state stifled. This circumstance, not only 
contributes to the politicization of the military by the incumbent government, it also 
squanders the military's combat power. This is a military confronting its greatest 
challenge - that of providing the regime with the needed leverage to negotiate a 
settlement - and it's hampered not only by operational failures, but by commitments that 
should be fulfilled by other sectors of society; in this case, by the business or 
entrepreneurial sector. 
D. POLITICAL SOCIETY 
Robert H. Dix discusses a wide range of factors in explaining Colombia's anned 
forces political behavior in Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change. The one 
variable he fails to fully explore is the role of political society. That is, the exclusionary 
role-played by the National Front in Colombian politics. This unique institutional 
arrangement was able to effectively block the politicization of the military by excluding 
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them and many other groups from the political process. The architects of the National 
Front understood the danger posed to the democratic regime if the military was allowed 
to stay in politics after the authoritarian rule of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-
1957) and the transitional government of the Military Junta that governed between 1957 
and 1958. The creation of this elite pact between Conservatives and Liberals prevented 
the military, as an institution, from displacing the political parties and perpetuating an 
authoritarian regime. In essence, the political elites co-opted the military. This co-
optation of the military by the civilian elite granted military officers broad privileges and 
virtual autonomy over military matters.62 
This type of civilian control is what Huntington would call subjective civilian 
control. Subjective civilian control is characterized by civilian groups maximizing their 
power by controlling or regulating the activities of the military; thus, minimizing the 
military's influence in politics. Through what in essence becomes the "buying off' of the 
military, the civilian political elite gains control of the military. Huntington argues that 
the type of civilian control that optimizes civil-military relations is objective civilian 
control- civilian control achieved by the professionalization of the officer COrpS.63 In the 
Colombian case, two types of subjective civilian control are used - civilian control by 
governmental institution until 1974 and control by Constitutional form after 1991. 
From the late 1950s until 1974 the National Front, as a governmental institution, 
was crucial to harmonizing Colombian politics. In essence, this institution served as an 
62 John Otis, "Colombian Army Stuck in Quagmire Against Insurgency," The Houston Chronicle 
Publishing Company; LEXISINEXIS [database on line]; accessed 20 February 1998. 
63 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 80-83. 
41 
arbiter between the Conservative and Liberal political elite, thus negating the need for the 
military to interfere in the political scene, as happened in so many other Latin American 
countries. Constitutional control was achieved through the Colombian Constitution of 
1991, which defines the constitutional roles and mission of the military in terms of 
security and defense. Until this constitution was written, the role of the military had been 
clearly defined in the Cddigo Militar Del General Santander, which stated that the 
fundamental mission of the Armed forces was to: "defend the national independence; 
maintain public order; and uphold the constitution and nationallaws."M 
The 1991 Constitution redefined the role of the military in articles II, III, IV and 
XXC. These articles have been interpreted by the military to imply that the armed forces 
will: (1) defend Colombian sovereignty; (2) protect and defend Colombian citizens; (3) 
participate in the protection of natural resources; and (4) execute the state's monopoly in 
the use of force. 65 The current constitution has assisted in casting the military in a role 
that focuses on issues of internal security, thus, perpetuating the military's role in 
protecting internal order. 
This fundamental departure from the Cddigo Militar tasking of maintaining 
internal public order - a role more appropriate for security forces - to maintaining 
internal security, implying the protection from internal threats to the regime, is significant 
because it grants the military a greater sphere of influence. 
64 MGEN Jose Roberto Ibanez Sanchez, p. 159. 
65 Jose Luis Cadena Montenegro, "Eficiencia del Ejercito de Colombia: Hipotesis Econ6micas y Politicas" 
(Master's Thesis, Universidad de los Andes, 1998), pp.80-83. 
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According to Wendy Hunter, military participation in civic and developmental 
roles contribute to create a positive image for the military, but it undermines the 
development of civilian institutions and contributes to a greater military role in 
government.66 In Colombia, the military's involvement with civic and developmental 
programs in the country, has served to improve the image of the military. However, an 
expanded involvement in these activities undermines the Colombian government in terms 
of efficacy and efficiency.67 This could lead to erosion of civil-military relations, as civil 
society would perceive the regime as being unable to meet, through the use of civil 
institutions, the social, economic, and security objectives of the population. 
One can conclude that as the violence in Colombia increases and the military is 
called upon to participate in missions to protect internal order, the armed forces will gain 
more prerogatives and democratic institutions will continue to weaken. 
E. THE UNITED STATES VARIABLE 
Other factors that play a significant role in the current state of civil-military 
relations in Colombia are military professionalism and the reluctance of the political elite 
to sponsor military solutions to domestic problems. Both of these are to some degree 
influenced by early U.S. participation in Colombian military and political culture, and 
require examination. 
Before U.S. military assistance commenced in the early 1940's, the Colombian 
armed forces were mainly organized civil militias. These militias were loyal to strong 
66 Wendy Hunter, p. 6. 
67 For a more in depth explanation see Juan 1. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, 
Breakdown and Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 
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regional caudillos, which used the force to support a particular political party or to serve 
as private armies. Military reform between 1924 and 1941 was conducted under the 
guidance of Swiss and German military missions, and focused on themes of 
reorganization and education, but without much success.68 The professionalization of the 
Colombian armed forces started in earnest when the government of Eduardo Santos' 
(1938-1942) accepted the first U.S. military training teams. Edwin Lieuwen points out 
that this acercamiento [rapprochement] between. both nations' militaries helped to 
professionalize the Colombian military in two ways. First, it provided an influx of U.S. 
military aid. Second, it allowed for the later participation of a Colombian battalion in the 
Korea conflict, which stimulated the army's sense of nationalism and gave it a sense of 
mission.69 
Colombia has been an active recipient of U.S. military aid, in its various forms -
Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Deployment for Training (DFT), Military Training Teams 
(MTT) and International Military Education and Training (lMET) - since the late 1940s. 
The amount of aid increased in the late 1980s, as the United States heightened its focus 
on counter-drug operations and identified Colombia as a Tier I country.70 However, the 
amount of direct military aid to the Colombian armed forces is currently severely limited. 
For example, in fiscal year 1997 the amount of U.S. aid received by the Colombian 
military was only $13 million dollars; roughly 11 percent of the total $199 million dollars 
68 MGEN Jose Ibanez Sanchez, pp. 174-179. 
69 Edwin Lieuwen, Anns and Politics in Latin America (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1960), p. 27, cited in 
Robert H. Dix, Colombia: The Political Dimension.I' of Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 
p.299. 
70 Tier I countries are those countries that are considered highly critical to the success of U.S, counter-drug 
strategy - Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. 
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in anti-narcotics money contributed by the United States to Colombia during the fiscal 
year. 71 Additionally, U.S. aid is restricted to units directly involved in counter-drug 
operations and can not, by U.S. statute, be used for other types of operations. 
Nevertheless, U.S. economic contributions, military-to-military contacts and 
professional education initiatives do not guarantee that the Colombian military will 
abstain from interfering in politics. For instance, the Brazilian experience with the return 
of its military from the European theater in World V!ar II argues that professionalization 
and U.S. military aid is not sufficient to prevent the military from participating in politics. 
In the Brazilian case, the increase in the professionalism of the armed forces caused by 
their participation in the European·theater of operations seemed to have precipitated the 
institution taking part in government. Alfred Stepan argues in The Military in Politics: 
Changing Patterns in Brazil, that officers that participated as members of the Brazilian 
Expeditionary Force developed unique political attitudes and beliefs that other officers of 
the military, and Brazilian society in general did not share.72 Brazil's close military ties 
with the United States, in which the latter provided significant education, financial aid, 
and training to Brazilian officers, played a significant role in the military's involvement 
with politics. 
71 Thomas T. Vogel, Jr. and Thomas E. Ricks, "Colombian Army Loses Ground in Drug War: Fight 
Against Guerrillas is Hampered by Charges of Human Rights Violations," The Wall Street Journal, 4 June 
1998,8A. 
72 Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1971), pp. 236-247. 
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The U.S. de-certification of Colombia seems to indicate that other factors, in 
addition to military aid, need to be present to increase the professionalism of the anned 
forces. These factors include, but are not limited to a comprehensive national security 
strategy and national defense plan developed by civilian authorities, which contribute to 
the establishment of clear roles and missions for the armed forces. It could be argued that 
U.S. de-certification does not reflect direct censure of Colombia's Anned Forces, but a 
critique of the Colombian government's ineffectiveness in supporting U.S. national 
counter-drug strategy. However, de-certification does highlight the anned forces' 
inability to disrupt the querrilla-narco connection, which speaks to the military's 
operational ability, due in part to the inability of the Colombian political elite to establish 
a national strategy. 
Twenty-five years ago, Richard Maulin stated that U.S. military aid served two 
objectives: first, to raise the military's effectiveness in counter-insurgency operations and 
internal security missions; and secondly, to promote the military's contribution to social 
and economic progress. The perfonnance of the military to date has fallen short in both 
areas. 
F. THE INTERNAL CONFLICT 
Today the insurgency problem continues to plague Colombia, and social and 
economic problems seem even more acute. Antonio Caballero, writing in Semana, 
directly blames the military for the increase in subversive acts in the country. He wrote, 
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They [the military] are in fact the principal cause for the increase. For 
decades Colombia's government has given the military a free hand to put 
an end to subversion and the subversion has merely increased.73 
Peru, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil have had to confront guerrilla threats. 
However, 
the repression of the Colombian left and the magnitude of its losses [over 
30,000 left wing militants, activist and sympathizers killed] are 
unparalleled in modem Latin American history.74 
The argument could be made that the guerrillas in Peru, Argentina, and Brazil 
operated in a different era and under a different type of regime. Nonetheless, in all cases 
the military had to focus internally, which produced dire institutional consequences -
mainly their active politicization. 
The proposition that a military with open-ended and ambiguous internal 
responsibilities leads to the weakening of societal institutions holds true, regardless of the 
era or regime type. Use of the armed forces in other countries in Latin America has 
already demonstrated that the dependence on the military for the maintenance of internal 
order is damaging to political and civil society. The internal orientation of the Colombian 
military has contributed to create a negative image of the armed forces. A poll conducted 
by El Tiempo in 1997, found that 41 percent of those questioned had a negative opinion 
of the military and 57 percent believed the armed forces were on the defensive. 75 
73 Henry Raymont, p. 3. 
74 Jorge G. Castaneda, Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1994), p.1l6. 
75 El Tiempo, 31 August 1997 cited in Jose Luis Cadena Montenegro, "Eficiencia del Ejercito de 
Colombia: Hipotesis Economicas y Politic as" (Master's Thesis, Universidad de los Andes, 1998), pp 176-
180. 
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Furthermore, by the late 1980s, it was obvious that the Colombian military had failed to 
gain control over both the subversive forces and the drug cartels. 
The military's involvement with and limited success in curtailing the guerrilla 
violence has an impact on civil-military relations for three reasons. First, there is the 
inability of the Colombian government to postulate a clear national security strategy, with 
the appropriate political and military components. Second, the civilians are less trusting 
of the military's ability to actively pursue operational prerogatives. Finally, civil society 
perceives that the military is unable to meet the security objectives of the population. 
These three factors combine to deprive the government of much needed leverage to 
curtail the opposition's operations and has led to the erosion in civil-military relations. 
Another factor that has had a negative impact on civil-military relations in Colombia is 
the severe reduction the armed forces have experienced in defense spending. 
An examination of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
Military Expenditure Database on Colombia's military spending from 1986 to 1995 
indicates that based on military expenditure, operational readiness is not on the rise for 
the Colombian military. The operating budget for the Colombian armed forces has 
decline since 1993. The budget was 525 million dollars in 1993, 600 million in 1994, 
and 400 million dollars in 1995.76 In 1995, this translated to 3.4 percent of the country's 
gross internal product or approximately five hundred dollars per service member. 
76 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, "Columbia, Military Spending 1986-96," available from 
www.sipri.se/projects/milex/expenditure/Co\ombia.htm\; Internet; accessed 8 September 1998. 
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SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, "Colombia, 
Spending 1986-96." 
Figure 3.1. Colombia, Military Expenditure 1987-96 
Budgetary reductions incurred by the anned forces have made them non-combat 
effective, which threatens the institution's ethos - its professionalism. In interviews 
conducted by Jose Luis Cadena Montenegro, senior level army officers highlight how 
budgetary constraints have hindered field operations.77 While the military's budget has 
been reduced, the guerrilla forces have considerable amounts of monies and sophisticated 
equipment to draw on, which may lead to disaster. 
Table 3.3 shows that by 1997 defense expenditure had increased to 5.0 percent of 
the national budget. However, this figure represents only 2.9 percent of the gross internal 
product. This increase only ranks Colombia sixth in national defense expenditure among 
selected countries in the region. This relative low expenditure in security does not 
77 Jose Luis Cadena Montenegro, pp. 157-168. 
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translate into operational victories in the field and as stated above, is one of the main 
reasons cited by military leaders for their operational failures. 
Table 3.3. Percentage of National Budget Spent on National Defense, 1997 
Country % 
Peru 38.6 







Source: Jose Luis Cadena Montenegro, 
"Eficiencia del Ejercito de Colombia: 
Hipotesis Economicas y Politicas" (Master's 
Thesis, Universidad de los Andes, 1998) p. 
129. 
Table 3.4 reflects that with the 1995 operating budget the Colombian armed 
forces end strength was only 160,193 on active duty. The Colombian Army comprises 
81.8 percent of the total force and is in most instances its the primary operating force. 
The Colombian Navy and Air Force, 11 percent and 7 percent respectively, compose the 
remainder of the force. Officers are usually drawn from the middle class and all must be 
graduates of one of the service academies. The enlisted population is composed of 
conscripts drawn from the eligible population. 












Source: Jose Luis Cadena Montenegro, "Eficiencia del Ejercito de Colombia: 
Hipotesis Economicas y Politicas" (Master's Thesis, Universidad de los Andes, 
(1998) p. 129. 
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However, Colombia's middle and upper class generally does not send its sons to 
combat. The majority of its forces are composed of conscripts that serve for periods of 
12 or 18 months, depending on the conscript's education level. In fact, a formal two-tier 
draft system is in place. One tier is composed of those conscripts that a have high school 
education. These are usually urban middle class conscripts that serve in jobs ranging 
from menial labor (stewards, drivers, etc.) to simple administrative positions for a period 
of eighteen months. They are usually assigned to safe metropolitan garrison jobs. Given 
that the local units conduct military training (instead of one basic training center), many 
of these recruits return home after the training day is over. Thus, the conscript is never 
far removed from his family support group. They rarely, if ever, see duty in the 
designated combat zones. 
The other tier is composed of those conscripts with a minimum education that are 
usually assigned to combat duty for a period of twelve months. These are usually rural 
and lower class conscripts of low educational backgrounds (6th grade) that serve their 
tour of duty in combat arms specialties - mostly infantry. The upshot of the two tier 
system is that the conflict has yet to directly touch the sons of the middle and upper 
classes. 
G. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The analysis of civil-military relations in Colombia reflect a "pattern of control 
in which civilians respect military autonomy over operational matters in exchange for 
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voluntary military subordination to civilian authority on other matters. ,,78 The pattern is 
experiencing severe strain. The civilian elites' use of sUbjective civilian control, which 
originated with the creation of the National Front, has been successful in co-opting and 
politicizing the armed forces. However, it is no longer effective in dealing with 
Colombia's current political challenges. The Andres Pastrana government could assist in 
developing initiatives that would solidify civil-military relations in Colombia, moving 
them closer to an objective civilian control model. 
1. The Political Society Initiative 
The state could start by clearly elaborating a set of roles and missions that 
delineate the function of the armed forces. It is the responsibility of the political elite to 
draw precise parameters and activities for the military in accordance with and in support 
of the Colombian constitution. Initial steps have been taken to provide· clear guidance to 
the military by the new Minister of Defense, Gilberto Echeverri Mejia. His Projecto de 
Ley de Seguridad y Defensa Nacional establishes four pillars for an effective national 
security and defense strategy - respect for human rights, solidarity, unity, and planning.79 
This will be the first time since 1968 that civilian authority attempted to codify the role of 
the security forces in the country. The commission that assisted in drafting the new law 
felt that: 
78 Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew, "The Current State of U.S. Civil-Military Relations: An 
Introduction," in Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew eds., u.s. Civil-Military Relations: In 
Crisis or Transition? (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), p. 5. 
79 Gilberto Echeverri Mejia, Projecto de Ley de Securidad y Defen.m Nacional (Bogota: Imprenta y 
Publicaciones de las Fuerzas Militares, 1997), pp. 20-46. 
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we cannot continue acting to exclusively solve short tenn problems. The 
dispersion of our resources and the constant changing of our goals bring to 
a stand still all efforts of the state.80 
This law, although charting a course, falls short of establishing a clear end-state 
and apportioning the necessary resources to meet Colombia's security needs. Policy 
without a budget is not policy at all. In a highly legalistic society it is just more political 
rhetoric. If the government chooses to direct the full attention of its 'monopoly on the 
use of force' to solve the current crisis, then it should adopt a national policy that would 
accomplish its mission. Colombia can accomplish this mission if it first develops, then 
implements a clear national strategy and dedicates the resources to realize such a strategy. 
This national security policy should contain at least two factors. First, it must 
include the political will of the current regime to re-claim its legitimacy throughout the 
nation. In short, the current regime needs a strategy that consolidates 'of the state. This 
can be accomplished if the state provides the services it is supposed to provide. Second, 
the military must take the fight to the enemy and win to make it more costly for the 
insurgents, and to gain the leverage needed by the political elite. 
2. The Military Initiative 
The Colombian military must take an offensive role and change the perception 
that the guerrillas are wining the war. The military must shed its garrison mentality, re-
orient its combat power to the affected zones, and overcome the psychological paralysis 
inflicted by media and human rights groups. It must institute policies that promote unit 
cohesion and combat effectiveness. It should end the fonnal two-tier conscription policy 
80 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
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and move towards an all-volunteer force. This would initially be more costly, but it 
would help develop a more professional force. Furthermore, recruit training should be 
centralized to standardize initial training objectives and follow-on assignments should be 
made on merit, not social standing. As part of a restructuring regimen, the military 
should remove itself from commitments in areas unrelated to national security. 
Removing the military from non-defense related activities could increase warfighting 
capabilities of the Colombian armed forces up to 50 percent. Additionally, higher 
combatant and supporting headquarters elements (Division and below) must deploy away 
from the safety of their garrisons and position themselves where they can influence the 
action. And lastly, but critical to the military's operational success, is that 
communications, intelligence, and the mobility infrastructure must be significantly 
enhanced. 
In summary, the armed forces in Colombia support the political system and are 
under firm governmental control. The military is not in a position to act as a main 
protagonist in any move to stifle the continual development of democratic institutions. 
Yet, Noticias Mejicanas (NOTIMEX) has reported, and former U.S. Ambassador to 
Colombia, Myles Frachette has confirmed, that civilians approached the U.S. Embassy in 
Colombia in order to explore relations with the U.S. in case of a COUp.SI The Colombian 
military may be an ever-increasing supporting actor in the breakdown of democracy, 
81 "Government Condemns US Official's Remarks on President Samper," British Broadcasting 
Corporation; LEXISINEXIS [database on line]; accessed II September 1997. 
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especially as the level of frustration continues to grow over its inability to stem the 
increase in guerrilla and cartel activity. 
The violence in Colombia is beyond a strictly military solution; military action in 
isolation will only serve to exacerbate the nation's problem. Furthermore, the tension 
between civil and military elites would continue to intensify unless the current regime 
frames a solution to the insurgency problem based not only on the use of military force, 
but also on social, economic and political justice. 
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IV. GUERRILLAS: THE NEW ELITES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters focused on Colombia's political problems and how they 
impacted the effectiveness, efficacy, and legitimacy of the government in terms of full 
democratic consolidation. The thesis has argued that the magnitude of the challenges 
facing the Colombian regime today seem to be obstructing the consolidation of 
democracy and facilitating its breakdown. The focus of the previous chapters has been on 
assessing the impact of those actors loyal to the regime - political society and the 
military. 
This chapter analyzes the impact the disloyal or semi-loyal opposition has had 
upon the Colombian political landscape. Linz defines the disloyal opposition as those 
actors who seek, through violent means, to corrupt and discredit the whole political 
system, and the semi-loyal opposition as those actors that in principle agree with the 
political system, but show a strong disagreement with the tactics employed by the ruling 
faction. Furthermore, Linz cautions that between the two, the most difficult threat to 
identify is the semi-loyal opposition.82 
This chapter, will assess the impact guerrilla forces, the disloyal opposition "par 
excellence" in Colombia have upon civil society at large and in political society in 
particular. In short, it will examine the impact that forty years of internal conflict has had 
82 Juan J. Linz, pp. 27-38. 
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upon Colombia. This chapter will also explore the narco-guerrilla connection and the 
role-played by the para-military units in Colombian society. An in-depth study of the 
current narco-guerrilla and para-military units' roles in Colombia is beyond the scope of 
this thesis and are topics worthy of much more effort than the cursory review they receive 
in this work. 
The puzzle that frames this chapter, is how Colombia's traditionally weak state 
with an exclusionary political system contributed to creating the conditions in which the 
government lacks the leverage to reach a negotiated settlement with the guerrillas. 
Historically, the Colombian state has been unable to deliver basic public services, foster 
economic prosperity, or exercise its legal functions. Strong regional actors have filled 
this void, with a tendency of creating para-statal organizations in the regions they 
control.S3 In many cases, these organizations are viewed as the only legitimate authority, 
especially in the rural regions of the southern and eastern sections of the country. 
It should be possible to formulate a strategy based on political, social, and 
economic reforms that could contribute to isolating Colombia's disloyal opposition. The 
two previous chapters highlighted some of the challenges that limit the formulation of a 
strategy that does not consider changes across the full economic, social, and political 
spectrum. However, the difficulty is that the Colombian guerrilla situation and the 
current negotiation process give rise to fluid and dynamic situations, which make 
developing a coherent strategy complex. 
83 Lawrence Boudon, "Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process," 
Journal of Latin American Studies 28 (May 1996): p. 280. 
58 
B. DISLOYAL, SEMI-LOYAL OPPOSITION 
The threat to the political survival of a regime comes from either reformists or 
revolutionaries, as demonstrated by the cases of Brazil (1964), Argentina (1973), and 
Mexico (1994). In Colombia, since 1958, the threat has been from revolutionaries. "The 
Colombian guerrilla movement pre-dates the Cuban Revolution by at least a decade, with 
three stages: (1) the period dominated by the liberal guerrillas (1949-1953); (2) the period 
marked by communist guerrillas (1955-1958); and (3) the emergence of ideologically 
diverse groups in the wake of the Cuban revolution (1962-1991)."84 The post 1991 stage 
has been a period of reduced ideological rhetoric and more of illegal economic 
diversification (especially narco-trafficking), and the consolidation of gains wrought by 
it. 
On the one hand, creation of the National Front did ameliorate the political 
violence of the period between 1958 and 1974. However, it did not eliminate the 
underlying reasons for social conflict - which were and are the economic, political, and 
social disenfranchisement of the marginalized sectors of society. On the other hand, it 
was extremely effective in excluding not only civil society from the political decision 
making process, but it excluded other elites has well. Elites excluded from the political 
process were forced to play outside normative democratic rules and considered armed 
revolution the only path available to bring change. 
If elites are defined "as persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions 
In powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and 
84 Jorge G. Castaneda, p. 75. 
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substantially,,,S5 then by definition the Colombian Left qualifies, at the very minimum, as 
new elites. Although, it could be argued that in its initial stages the guerrilla movements 
in Colombia were far from being elites, the evidence supports the observation that by 
1962 these groups wielded considerable political and economic power. Thus, they sought 
to transform an exclusionary political system, which catered to Conservatives and 
Liberals, by the use of violence. Given that Colombia's closed political system allowed 
no legal avenues for inclusion unless sponsored by the two main political parties, the only 
course left for those outside the system was to seek violent change. The rest of this 
chapter describes how those who choose change by violent means have come to control 
significant political, economic, and social power. 
C. THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS 
Ever since the success of the Cuban revolutionary movement, Latin America as a 
whole and Colombia in particular have experienced some type of leftist activity. 
Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley in Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, 
establishes five conditions that he asserts must prevail for a leftist movement to succeed 
in Latin America. They are 1) peasant support, 2) adequate guerri]]a strength, 3) divided 
and corrupt elite, 4) cross-class alliance, and 5) withdrawal of U.S. support. 86 These 
conditions, he asserts are necessary and sufficient to cause a shift to a leftist regime as the 
85 Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley, "Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic 
Regimes," in John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America 
and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 9. 
86 Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America (Princeton, 1992), p. 305. 
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author demonstrated in his comparative analysis of the cases of Cuba and Nicaragua.87 
Table 4.1 applies his findings to the current Colombian situation. 
Table 4.1. Conditions That Favor Guerrilla Success in Colombia 
...,.."..,,------, 
Condition for Success Rating 1961-1991 Rating 1991-1998 
1. Peasant support for the guerrillas. Moderate to High Moderate 
- ___ .,......,.--,----1 
2. Adequate guerrilla military strength. Low Moderate to High 
3. Divided and corrupt ruling elite. Low to Moderate Moderate to High 
4. A cross-class alliance against the regime. Low Low 
:-----~ 5. Withdrawal of U.S. support for the regime. Low Low 
-------,,-1 
Source: Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America (Princeton, 1992), pp. 
302-326; and various news briefs. 
The assignment of low, moderate, and high ratings to the factors, a modification 
of Wickham-Crowley's path-breaking work, helps the reader visualize the current 
Colombian situation. The rating provides a quick assessment of the contemporary 
situation in Colombia. Furthermore, it is a good indicator of the areas where the 
guerrillas are strongest in political terms. It is interesting to note that three out of the five 
c<;>nditions (peasant support, guerrilla strength, and corrupt ruling elite) are rated 
moderate or higher. Conditions four and five (cross-class alliance and U.S. support), 
which are low, could permanently shift under certain conditions, such as Colombia being 
once again decertified by the U.S. or by the withdrawal of U.S. aid, due to a shift in U.S. 
national drug or security strategy. The loss of U.S. support could cause resentment 
within Colombia's social classes precipitating new alliances. 
In fact, this situation already occurred in 1996, when Colombia was the first 
democracy to be de-certified by the United States. And again in 1997, when Colombia 
was de-certified, but sanctions were not imposed because Colombia was deemed 'vital to 
87 Ibid., pp. 302-326. 
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U.S. national interests. The de-certification of 1996 and 1997 (without sanctions) 
produced great animosity, both politically and economically, between the two nations. 
The political and economic sanctions had two severe consequences. 
First, was the loss of regime legitimacy - de-certification decreased Colombia's 
government legitimacy and weakened its position in the international forum. 8R Second, 
was an increase in guerrilla activity. Guerrilla activity rose due to a surge of nationalism. 
Therefore, one can conclude, based on those factors examined, that if left unchecked by 
the Colombian or international community, the Colombian guerrillas are likely to 
succeed. This all leads to great uncertainty within the country. 
What is certain is that throughout the years Colombia's Left has experienced a 
metamorphosis. If the pattern of the disloyal opposition in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s 
was the use of violence for political gain from within the state, the pattern of violence 
since the 1960s can be referred to as the use of violence for political gain directed against 
the state.89 The paradigm shift to the belief that "socialist revolution could come about 
and be victorious only through armed struggle, as opposed to the traditional 'peaceful 
paths' previously favored by the Latin American left,,,QO was a consequence ofthe success 
of the Cuban Revolution. This is the strategy used by groups such as the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN), Peoples' 
Liberation Army (EPL), Ricardo Franco Front, Quintin Lame Indigenous Self-Defense 
Command, and a host of other politically active movements in Colombian politics. 
88 Alberto J. Mejia, p. 36. 
89 Ronald P. Archer, p. 167. 
QO Jorge G. Castaneda, p. 72. 
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Of these, F ARC and the ELN, are the most significant and continue to pose a 
serious threat to Colombian political stability. F ARC and ELN have rejected recent 
peace proposals from the current regime. The Departamento Nacional de Planeacion 
(DNP) [National Planning Department] reports that "FARC and ELN are now 15 times 
greater than in 1981; they were firmly established in 173 municipalidades as of 1985. 
Today, these figures have increased to 600 of the 1,024 municipalidades in the nation.'09J 
This is a net increase of 39 percent in the sphere of influence of these organizations. The 
DNP reports that FARC and ELN are economically wealthier than the armed forces. For 
1995, FARC and ELN are reported to have collected over 2 billion dollars in extortion 
and kidnapping royalties, with an additional 900 million dollars from dealings with the 
drug cartels. F ARC and ELN are strongest in Caqueta, Guaviare, Meta and the Putamayo 
Departments. These are rural-based warfighting organizations whose members are better 
paid and trained than a regular army conscript. 
In 1964, Fabio Vasquez Castano established the Marxist ELN, structured on the 
Cuban Revolution model. Manuael Marulanda Velez officially established the FARC in 
1966 as the armed wing of the Colombia's Communist Party. 92 Their Marxist-Leninist 
platform still advocates massive land and wealth redistribution, as well as, greater 
government spending on social programs. However, FARC's investment in land, 
transportation and other enterprises in connection with the drug trade has forced a shift to 
operational capitalism. ELN, while following a similar agenda as F ARC, focuses on 
91 Henry Raymont, p. 6. 
92 Colombia: A Country Study (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1990), pp. 306-307. 
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nationalization issues, especially with respect to the oil industry.93 Michael Radu and 
Vladimir Tismaneanu state that, of the two, ELN is more directly concerned with national 
politics and the concept of armed struggle.94 These two organizations accounted for over 
ninety percent of all guerrilla activity during the period of 1978 to 1994 as shown in 
Figure 4.1. They also control of significant amount of resources ($42 million). 
Table 4.2 displays the growth of the guerrilla problem in Colombia. The total 
number of guerrillas operating across the nation has grown significantly, from about 
2,240 in 1978 to 10,600 in 1994; a net increase of373.2 percent.95 
Table 4.2. Guerrilla Manpower Growth in Colombia 
Group 1978- 1982- 1986-1990 1990-1994 Total Increase (%) 
1982 1986 (1978-1994) 
FARC 600 2200 1800 1000 466.6 
ELN 40 1570 800 550 1557.8 
EPL 250 1050 -150 -700 4.5 
M-19 - 450 900 0 100 - 86.6 
Net Total 440 5720 2450 950 373.2 
Source: Jesus E. La Rotta M., Las Finanzas de la Suhversion Colomhiana: Una Forma de Explotar 
La Nacion (Bogota: Ediciones Los Ultimos Patriotas, 1996), p. 61. 
93 Eileen Bradley and James L. Zackrison, "Colombia Sovereignty Under Siege," National Defense 
University Strategic Forum, Number 112, May 1997, pp.I-2. 
94 Michael Radu and Valadimir Tismaneanu, Latin American Rel'Olutionaries: Groups. Goals. Methods 
(New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1990), pp. 149-162. 
9S Jesus E. La Rotta M., Las Finanzas de la Suhversion Colomhiana: Una Forma de Explotar la Nacion 
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Source: Compiled by the au1hors from variOlJs sources. 
Source: James L. Zackrison and Eileen Bradley, "Colombia 
Sovereignty Under Siege," National Defense University Strategic 
Forum, No. 112, May 1997, p. 5. 
Figure 4.1. FARe and ELN Area of Operations 
Not only are FARe, ELN, and other groups a threat to democratic consolidation, 
they also extract a real cost in terms of Colombia's economic stability. Semana, an 
independent newspaper, reported that the Colombian economy lost 18.4 billion dollars in 
1994, approximately 3.4 percent of Colombia's GDP, due to guerrilla activity.96 In a 
recent report, the National Planning Department (DNP) stated that Colombia's long-
96 Eileen Bradley and James L. Zackrison, pp. 2-5. 
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running war with leftist guerrillas claimed more than 17,000 lives at a cost of about 12.5 
billion dollars between 1990 and 1994.97 During this same period it is estimated that 
17,624 Colombians were killed as a consequence of guerrilla actions. Of these deaths 
9,450 were civilians, 5,710 were guerrillas, and 2,464 were members of the state's 
security forces. Fifty-four of every one hundred deaths related to guerrilla violence are 
civilians, while thirty-two percent and fourteen percent are guerrillas and security forces 
personnel respectively.98 
In a different study conducted by the DPN between 1987 and 1992, it was 
reported that on the average the country experienced 20,030 murders per year, of which 
97 percent are never solved.99 This makes Colombia the most violent democracy in the 
world. The government's inability to deal effectively with this threat raises questions 
about its capability to properly provide security for the masses. Hector Aquilar Camin, 
writing for El Proceso magazine, states that it is necessary to strengthen the state's 
coercive powers because, without political stability and public safety, democracy will be 
nothing more than a form of fragmentation and discord. 1oo However, caution must be 
exercised before strengthening the state's coercive power. For an increase in the use of 
coercive force without a coherent and cohesive political strategy will most certainly 
exacerbate the current wave of violence. That the current regime is seeking to address 
some of the political imbalances is evident; but it is early to see the impact. 
97 Henry Raymont, p. 7. 
98 Jose L. Cadena Montenegro, p. 25. 
99 MGEN Jose Robert Ibanez Sanchez, pp. 404-405. 
100 Henry Raymont, p. 9. 
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Unfortunately, the desire to achieve fundamental changes in Colombian society 
has not been matched by the resources needed to implement those changes. For example, 
according to the National Defense Council, combined income sources yield an average 
income of $70,000 per guerrilla, compared to $900 dollars per soldier in the Anny.IOI 
Even if one-tenth of this asymmetrical economic relation is true, it is a strong indicator 
that the government lacks the resources to meet the needs of its society. However, as in 
most insurgency situations, it is difficult to differentiate between monies and deaths 
generated by random acts of criminal violence and politically motivated violence such as 
extortion, kidnappings and drug protection service. 
Two facts concern the state. First, that even under governments that have actively 
sought a negotiated settlement with the Left, the guerrillas have grown in relative terms. 
This indicates that the guerrilla organizations seem to use periods of negotiation to 
reconstitute and intensify operations. This creates a dilemma for the state - how does it 
pursue negotiations in order to close the social-political gap without an increase in 
violence. Second is the negative growth of M -19, which is explained by its movement 
from disloyal opposition to semi-loyal opposition under a peace agreement sponsored by 
the Virgilio Barco Vargas government in 1989. 
John Higley and Richard Gunther write that: 
the efforts to deal with guerrilla movements have been schizophrenic, 
alternately emphasizing repression and a search for a negotiated 
settlement that would permit the integration of these movements into 
national politicallife.102 
101 Ibid., p. 10. 
102 John Higley and Richard Gunther, p. 105. 
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On the one hand, Colombia's political elite has failed to set the appropriate 
conditions to gain peace through negotiations . and, thus, have contributed to the 
destabilization of the current regime. On the other hand, the guerrilla groups seem to use 
the negotiating process as a period of consolidation and thus creating the perception of 
negotiating only when it serves their interest. 
The first period of negotiation was initiated during the presidency of Belasario 
Betancur Cuartas (1982-1986). He was able to create an atmosphere of peaceful co-
existence by issuing two decrees: Ley 35 and Ley 49. 103 This culminated in the creation 
of the Comision Naciona! de Verificacion [National Verification Commission] and the 
Comision De Did!ogo [Dialogue Commission] which were instrumental in the creation of 
a vehicle for political expression for the Left: the Union Patriotica Party. This period is 
followed by what some consider the most successful period of peace negotiations in the 
country, those conducted by the Virgilio Barco Vargas government, which culminated in 
the legitimization ofM-19. In the late 1980s, dramatic changes in the international arena 
caused a loss of economic backing for the guerrillas, forcing them to seek new alliances 
with the Colombian drug cartels. By the end of 1990s, efforts to seek a negotiated 
settlement stalled because of a high degree of guerrilla criminal involvement. They 
reached their nadir during the government of Ernesto Samper. 
103 For more in depth explanation see Jesus E. La Rotta M., Las Finanzas de la Suhversion Colomhiana: 
Una Forma de Explotar la Nacion. p. 53. 
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The Barco administration, capitalizing on the debacle created by the takeover of 
the Palace of Justice in 1985,104 did move to d~mobilize the country's insurgencies. 
FARC and ELN refused to participate, but M-19 and EL accepted the government's 
terms. 105 The violent actions taken by M-19 during the Palace of Justice operation 
negatively impacted the guerrilla group and derailed the peace accords. 
As a guerrilla movement: 
M -19 made its first appearance on the Colombian political scene in 1974 
and the group was regarded has one of Cuba's main partners in the export 
of revolutionary ideology and drugs. 106 
However, M-19 has been effective in joining the political mainstream as Acci6n 
Democratica M-19 (AD-MI9) and assuming the role as semi-loyal opposition. In 
essence AD-MI9 became a political force operating from within the system; AD-MI9 is 
an example ofLinz' observation that "agreement in principle and disagreement on tactics 
is a frequent indicator of semi-Ioyalty.,,107 The M-19 shift was possible because the 
organization was offered extremely good political terms by the regime, which supported 
its prior desire not to be excluded from the drafting of the 1991 Constitution. In short, the 
government used the leverage created by the promise of participation in the creation of a 
new political framework in order to raise the stakes. 
However, this actually makes the AD-MI9 more dangerous, because they now 
can pursue a legal process in conjunction with continual guerrilla support to achieve their 
104 In 1985, M-19 took over the Place of Justice, and the government responded with undue force. In the 
fire fight that ensued various government officials died, as well as a majority of the Supreme Court 
justices. A cadre of the M-19 was massacred. 
lOS Ronald P. Archer, p. 197. 
106 Jorge G. Castaneda, p. 112. 
107 Juan J. Linz, p. 33. 
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aims. AD-MI9 won 12.5 percent of the votes in the 1990 presidential elections and 26.8 
percent in the 1990 constituent assembly elections, lOR but their leaders have been unable 
to capitalize on these gains. 
Polls taken in Colombia in early 1991 showed that a great number of 
Colombians (58.5 percent) believed M-19 would attain power, and its 
leader and former candidate Antonio Navarro Wolff was deemed the 
Colombian politician most likely to become president in the decades of 
the nineties. 109 
However, AD-MI9 and Union Patriotica (UP), the party that represents FARC's 
political interest, are unable to consolidate due Colombia's entrenched two-party system. 
An analysis of the May 1998 election results reflect just how powerful these political 
institutions are. In the first round of voting the Conservative and Liberal parties reaped 
81 percent of the votes. The combined electoral support for the AD-MI9, UP and other 
minor parties was only 19 percent. These parties made no significant showing in the 
presidential race and of 263 seats in the Colombian Congress their members were elected 
to 27, approximately 10 percent. In contrast, the Liberal Party controls 156 seats (59.3 
percent) and the Conservati ve Party 80 seats (30.4 percent) of the congress. 110 
D. THE PARAMILIT ARIES 
The reaction from the Right to the increase in violence from the Left and the 
inability of the government to establish its legitimacy by enforcing the rule of law, has 
been the creation of paramilitary groups. These groups were originally created under a 
108 Juan 1. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?" in Juan 1. Linz 
and Arturo Valenzuela eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994), p. 210. 
109 Jorge G. Castaneda, p. 115. 
110 The Electoral Web Site (Elections in Colombia); available from 
http://www.agora.stm.itlelectionlcolombia.htm;Internet; accessed 29 October 1998. 
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Presidential Decree (Decreto 3398) and Law 48 as a counterinsurgency tool by the state. 
Originally intended to be self-defense forces, they evolved to become armed 
organizations with close ties to military intelligence units and police forces. Designed as 
military type organizations, these units were originally trained and equipped to assist the 
armed forces in their counterinsurgency efforts. However, it was only a matter of time 
before a weak state would lose control of these groups. Now they have become the 
private army of the great landowners and drug-traffickers. These groups, called grupos 
de justicia privada (private justice groups), function solely for the personal benefit and 
profit of its members. III They are mainly comprised of unemployed workers, retired 
military, and plain criminals, and are trained by national or international mercenaries. 112 
Under the pretense of self-defense, protecting the population and fighting the 
guerrilla threat, they now are responsible for an increase in violence. These groups focus 
on a variety of criminal activities, such as assassinations, kidnappings, money laundering 
and robberies. The Colombian armed forces consider their activities as destabilizing as 
those of the guerrillas. I 13 The activities of these groups add to the already 
institutionalized violence that is tearing the country by dispensing their own form of 
justice under the appearance of protecting the democratic system. Their participation in 
Colombia's violent history has not assisted in dampening the Left's operational capacity. 
III Guia de Estudio: Curso de Estado Mayor Escuela de Guerra (Bogota: Departamento de Ejercito, 1998), 
pp. 154 -165. 
112 Jose Cadena Montenegro, pp.31-36. 
113 Guia de Estudio: Curso de Estado Mayor Escuela de Guerra, p.154. 
71 
E. TWO STATES, ONE NATION 
Guerrilla forces continue to increasingly avoid direct force on force confrontation 
with government authorities, even though the guerril1a forces have grown in number. 
Carlos Restrepo wrote recently that, directly or indirectly, guerril1as exercised significant 
influence in 600 of Colombia's 1002 municipalities. FARC's operational units are in 
control of over 60 percent of the country. He further states that "guerrillas have focused 
their energy on controlling municipal governments in order to compensate for their lack 
of a national political agenda."114 Although F ARC does not directly participate in 
government, sources such as El Espectador and El Tiempo report that they control local 
budgets and closely supervise the activities of mayors and other government officials. 
Guerrilla groups have succeeded in establishing a presence among the popUlation more 
effectively and in a broader fashion than civilian authority. 
The above situation fundamental1y creates two Colombias, one influenced by the 
government, mainly the urban centers, and the other influenced by the guerril1a forces, 
mainly the rural sectors. In essence, for those areas in which the state is weak,"[t]he 
guerrillas are the de facto state, even though the real state may maintain a presence de 
jure."1IS This way the guerril1a forces have been able to strengthen their attack on 
democracy, create political instability, stifle social development, and inflict higher 
economic cost in the country. In fact, they have been responsible for former President 
114 Yadira Ferrer, p. 2. 
lIS Lawrence Boudon, "Guerrillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process," 
Journal of Latin American Studies 28 (May 1996): 290. 
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Samper declaring states of emergency, fundamentally forcing him to invoke his 
constitutional powers in the name of national security. 
Former President Samper believed that the use of force is a necessary condition 
for dialogue to be useful. He stated that "dialogue per se leads nowhere, and force 
exercised in an arbitrary maimer leads to brutality.""/> However, Samper's political 
problems prevented his government from developing a strategy that would lead to peace. 
Furthermore, this aggressive attitude was viewed by the guerrillas as a lack of a coherent 
peace policy by the state and as an impediment to negotiations between the warring 
factions. In a FARC-EP declaration, the guerrilla forces stated that the government's 
position with regard to the use of force obstructed peaceful democratic action. 
Given that neither F ARC nor ELN recognize the legitimacy of the state, they, in 
the role of a disloyal opposition, seek to reject its political rule by the use of coercive 
powers. According to Linz, this intransigent attitude challenges the state's authority to 
guarantee the civil liberties of all citizens within the territorial boundaries, which is of 
particular importance in a functioning democracy.' J7 
Furthermore, FARC-EP is seeking to enter the peace process and in a recent 
publication 'The Search for Peace, A Nation's Yearning' recognized their cease fire and 
peace agreements signed with the Betancur's administration in 1984. The hurdle at this 
moment seems to be FARC's failure to recognize the legitimacy of the Samper 
administration for reasons stated earlier. However, with the recent election of President 
116 Emesto P. Samper, p. 7. 
117 Juan 1. Linz, p. 61. 
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Andres Pastrana this obstacle should no longer be a consideration. Yet, in the first few 
months of the Pastrana regime guerrilla activity has increased. This may be a clear 
indication that the guerrillas are not prepared to negotiate seriously with any regime. 
On the military front the guerrillas seem to have gained parity and some would 
argue an edge. They have failed to transform their military gains into political capital. 
Groups like F ARC and ELN, to date, have been incapable of taking advantage of the 
traditional parties' weaknesses and defects. Archer takes it one step further, writing, 
the subversive movements in Colombia have in fact marginalized the non-
traditional electorate through the use of repression and imitation of other 
foreign revolutionary movements. 118 
Factionalism has also had a detrimental effect on the left's ability to consolidate 
political gains. A more tangible source of the general weakness of the opposition in 
Colombia has been sectarianism, isolationism, and bickering among themselves. 119 The 
current inability of the regime to find a solution to the problem of armed disloyal 
opposition has, as Linz postulated, increased the level of violence now present in the 
nation. 
F. PEACE: AN ELUSIVE TARGET 
Although it is too soon to tell, the current round of negotiations, initiated by the 
Pastrana government in Germany in August of 1998, has shown little results, due to the 
government's lack of negotiating leverage. Lack of political, military and social leverage 
has forced the government to cede in some important strategic areas. These include the 
lIB Ronald P. Archer, p. 196. 
119 Robert H. Dix, p. 291. 
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promise to recognize the guerrilla groups that join the negotiations as political actors, 
even as they continue the de-militarization of certain municipalities and restrict military 
operations. 120 
The public centerpiece for the current government's position is the granting of 
pardons to the belligerent parties under Section II, Article 201, which states that "the 
government may grant pardons for political crimes, in accordance with the law, and 
inform the Congress after the exercise of this authority.,,121 Unlike amnesty, which 
prohibits the prosecution and punishment, a pardon only prohibits punishment. 
Furthermore, the country's penal code (Ley 418 de 1997) states that 
pardons cannot be granted to persons who have committed atrocious, 
ferocious or barbaric crimes, terrorism, kidnapping, genocide and 
homicides not within the realm of combat. 122 
Because guerrilla activities and criminal activities, beyond those normally associated with 
revolutionary movements, are intertwined in the Colombian situation, the pardons could 
have a negative impact on normal criminal procedures. In short, use of this particular 
tool by the government weakens the Judicial Branch and threatens the rule oflaw. 
To date, the government has ceded major strategic concessions with little or no 
cessation in activities by the guerrillas. This can lead to only two conclusions: 1) the 
government's position is so weak that they are willing to mortgage the state; and 2) that 
the guerrilla movement in Colombia has long ceased to be concerned with social, 
120 "Gobierno Reconocera Status Politico a la Guerrilla," El Nacional, 3 September 1998 [newspaper on-
line]; available from http://el-nacional.comleln030998/pa2s3.htm; Internet; accessed 11 September 1998. 
121 "Indulto: Tan Ancho Como Tan Largo," El Espectador, 15 September 1998 [newspaper on-line]; 
available from http://www.elespectador.coml9809115/genotici.htm; Internet; accessed 15 September 1998. 
122 Ibid. 
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political and economic refonns for the marginalized sectors of society. Unfortunately, 
both conditions hold true. The government, due to the historic weakness of the state, is 
unable to reclaim its legitimacy, and the guerrillas are unwilling to exchange their illicit 
economic enterprises for political legitimacy. 
G. THE NARCO CONNECTION 
The involvement of the Colombian guerrilla in acts of violent illegal activities is 
multifaceted, spanning from extortion to assassinations to drugs - all extremely lucrative. 
Thus, deciphering the Colombian political puzzle would not be complete without 
examination of the relationship between the drug cartels and the guerrillas and its impact 
on Colombia's social and political system, to include the evolution of the guerrilla 
organizations into the drug trade. 
As stated before, the magnitude and complexity of the narco-guerrilla problem 
merits separate attention, and is an analysis beyond the scope of this study. However the 
relations between the cartel and guerrillas, and the cartel and political parties, are such a 
significant part of the Colombian political scene, that one is compelled to address this 
symbiotic relationship.123 
The cartels support their actions on a social and political - base by forming 
political parties, buying newspapers, absorbing the cost of social projects - and have been 
successful influencing those sectors where the state and the traditional elites are least 
effective. 124 For example Pablo Escobar, before his untimely death, ran and was elected 
123 Alberto 1. Mejia, pp. xii-xvi. 
124 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
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to Colombia's House of Representatives in 1982. Barrio Pablo Escobar, a subdivision of 
360 homes, stands as a tribute to the drug-lord's philantrophy in Medellin. 125 In essence, 
the established order in Colombian society is not only threatened by revolutionary 
appeals, but by the well-financed clientelism of the drug organizations. 126 Eric G. Pemett, 
in his article' Universidad: Geopolitical y Crisis Institucional en Colombia,' recognizes 
that the Colombian economy is faced with the convergence of three of the most profitable 
enterprises today: oil, weapons, and drugs. 127 
It is no secret that the impact of the drug trade is being felt at the highest levels of 
political, economic, and civil society. The past Samper government was thrown into 
crisis by charges that his 1994 campaign received $6 million dollars from the Cali drug 
cartel.l28 This scandal contributed to the U.S. de-certification of Colombia in March 
1996. The threat to government stability from narco activities caused the Samper regime 
to declare states of emergency on several occasions during its term to protect public order 
and stabilize state institutions. 
Colombian authorities have had some success in reducing the activities of the 
Medellin and Cali Cartels. Cartel members have responded to this success with a 
declaration of war on the regime, using bombings and assassinations. The terrorist-like 
actions being employed by groups such as 'The Extraditables' adds to the violence 
125 Tina Rosenberg, pp. 68-70. 
126 John Higley and Richard Gunther, p. 107. 
127 Erick G. Pernett, "Universidad: Geopolitical y Crisis Institucional," El Colombiano, 9 May 1996 
[newspaper on-line]; available from http://www.sistecol.com/@elcolombiano/9605/09/j02.htm; Internet; 
accessed 11 September 1997. 
128 Carol Giacomo, "U.S. Calls for Probe of Tapes, Rueters World Service; LEXISINEXIS [database on 
line]; accessed 11 September 1997. 
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already being spread by the guerrilla forces throughout the country. The void left by the 
loss of the cartels' top bosses has crippled cartel operations and opened the door for 
increased guerrilla activity in the narcotrafficking business. 
Increased guerrilla activity in the trade of illicit drugs - marihuana, cocaine and 
heroin - can be separated in seven phases. In each phase, the organization's role in the' 
production, transport, and distribution of the product has deepened. The most active 
organizations are FARC and ELN. However, oth~r groups and some criminal elements 
also participate to one degree or another. Table 4.3 depicts the seven phases that have led 
to the Colombian guerrilla controlling all facets of drug production, from cultivation to 
internal and external commercialization of the product. 129 
Today the guerrillas control significant portions of all narcotics operations. The 
El Espectador, in 'La Guerrilla, Nuevo Imperio Narco,' reports that, as of July 1996, 
F ARC and ELN forces controlled ninety percent of all internal illicit drug commerce. 
Table 4.3. Phases of Guerrilla Drug Operations 
Phase Condition 
I Protection and extortion services for the Cartels. 
II A protection and extortion service at processing sites, runways and of raw materials. 
III Protection and extortion of production, transport and commercialization of precursor 
chemicals. 
IV Development of transport services and infrastructure. 
V Investment in cultivation sites, in support of cartel and own operations. 
---------1 
VI Establishment of processing sites. 
VII Establishment of their own production, processing, transport and distribution network. 
Source: Jesus E. La Rotta M., Las Finanzas de la Subversion Colombiana: Una forma de Explotar La 
Nacion (Bogota: Los Ultimos Patriotas, 1996), pp. 197-198. 
129 Jesus E. La Rotta M., p.199. 
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Furthennore, it is estimated that the guerrillas' control seventy-five percent of the 
area used in the cultivation of marijuana, coca qr poppy.130 This infonnation is not 
surprising, because, with the end of the cold war and the initial move to peace under the 
Betancur government, guerrillas had to tum to alternative means of financial support. 
One factor that caused this shift was that their primary source of financial and political 
support, the Soviet Union and Cuba, were experiencing radical transfonnations. Another 
reason, given by Jesus E. La Rotta M., was that the guerrillas believed that it was riskier 
to continue with kidnappings and extortion, since these activities had been outlawed by 
the peace accords.131 What is surprising, however, is that now the guerrillas have the 
ability to control an internal market that produces over $150 million dollars of profit a 
year.132 The guerrillas are effective and efficient in generating a profit from narco-
trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, and other illegal activities. Table 4.4 shows the 
success the guerrilla forces have experienced in generating revenue. These funds are 
usually used to acquire the accoutrements of war, thus prolonging the status quo of 
continual violence. 
Once again, the government finds itself under siege - its legitimacy lost as its 
members fall victim to the latest narco-related political scandal. Its effectiveness is 
continual decline as the government is unable to defeat the guerrilla force, and allegations 
130 MGen. Jose Ibanez Sanchez, p. 420. 
131 Jesus E. La Rotta M., p. 212. 
132 Eric G. Pernett, p. 2. 
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Table 4.4 Guerrilla Revenue (1991-1994) in Millions of Dollars . 
Activity 1991 1992 1993 1994 Total 
Drug-Trafficking 147,074 134,273 149,247 177,040 607,634 
Robbery and Extortion 95,707 87,079 96,896 136,477 416,159 
Kidnapping 64,099 58,000 45,922 116,730 284,751 
Other Activity 25,244 22,883 39,608 86,041 173,776 
Total (by year) 332,124 302,235 331,673 516,288 1,482,320 
., . , Source: Jose LUIS Cadena Montenegro, "Eficlencla del Ejerclto de ColombIa: Hlpotesls Econ6mlcas y 
Politic as" (Master's Thesis, Universidad de los Andes, 1998) p. 28.13) 
of drug money in government coffers are made. The regime's efficacy has been nullified 
due to the inability of the government to define and carry out an agenda. Furthermore, 
the Colombian security forces lack the resources and material that would permit a 
credible assault on the war on drugs. 
H. DEVELOPING A STRATEGY 
This gives rise to a new Colombian reality, that of an unscrupulous criminalized 
Left pitted against a civil, economic, and political society that seems to lack the fortitude, 
leadership and resources to stem the tide of violent onslaught. 
As an initial step in developing a national strategy that would assist in solving 
both the political and criminal problems, the Colombian government should delineate 
clear strategic goals. These goals could serve as targets in the development of policy by 
various political, civil and economic actors. This should be followed by the regime 
dedicating the resources needed to achieve the goals in a coherent fashion. The 
Colombian government has a variety of policy options, based on their appreciation of the 
133 The original data was expressed in Colombian pesos. The author has converted those figures into U.S. 
dollars by using the exchange rate published by the International Monetary Fund in the International 
Financial Statistic Journal of 1995. 
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threat. The following section presents three such options: 1) the Radical Solution; 2) the 
Two Problems, Two Solutions; and 3) the One Problem Solution. 
1. The Radical Solution 
Political and economic elites accept that the state is unable to consolidate and 
establish its legitimacy in the regions under guerrilla control and cede these to the . 
guerrillas, in essence, granting legitimacy to the guerrilla forces and creating two 
Colombias. Although this approach sounds radical"it would in essence be the fastest way 
to achieve a temporary and transient peace. Temporary, because the new guerrilla-state 
would in all possibility be some type of narco-Ieftist regime. Transient, because no 
Colombian ruler would want his presidential legacy to be the losing of approximately half 
the country's territory. Nor would civil, economic or military society be willing to 
knowingly create a new state that would pose a direct threat. Therefore, armed conflict 
would follow. 
The new state would most likely be authoritarian. Its authoritarian, nature given 
the current world dynamics, is almost certainly doomed to failure. Given that, its main 
economic source would be the illicit production, processing, transshipment and sale of 
illegal narcotics, it would in all certainty become a pariah state, thus creating instability in 
the region and cause for intervention from the international community. In short, this 
would elevate the problem to the international arena, which has more tools at its disposal 
than the current Colombian regime. 
However, this approach would allow for Bogota's centrist government to be able 
to focus on that region in which the state has legitimacy. It would be able to exercise 
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authority by collapsing its scarce resources and manpower in areas that are essential to 
the state. Security forces could then proceed to, establish the rule of law and bring 
adequate forces to bear on solving the criminal violence, which now affects the region. 
The political and economic elites could develop a strategy that would address the social 
and economic inequalities within the new territory. The Colombian armed forces would 
acquire an external mission of providing security for the new and reduced state, a role 
they could accomplish without considerable reorganization, since most of their forces are 
west of the Cordillera. 
2. Two Problems, Two Solutions 
This course of action calls for the splitting of Colombia's dilemma into two 
different problems. The first, would be the guerrilla problem, with its fundamental roots 
in social, economic and political inequalities. The second, would be the drug problem 
and all the criminality attached with it. This is fundamentally the current institutional 
approach. It is the institutional approach because it allows for the support of the United 
States in terms of the drug war, while allowing for U.S. deniability in support of the 
counter-guerrilla effort. 134 
If this approach is to succeed, then the current Colombian regime must 
aggressively develop a strategy that isolates the two problems. In the guerrilla case, it has 
to focus on developing and executing a policy that would make the cost of operations to 
the guerrilla forces extremely high. It should begin by militarily reclaiming those areas 
134 Schemo, Diana J., "In Colombia, Accord Comes Without Peace," The New York Times, 28 June 1998, 
sec. Week in Review, p. 5. 
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over which the guerrilla exercise control, supporting those military operations with social, 
political and economic programs that reinforces the legitimacy of the state. Specific 
social programs should include agrarian reform, educational reform and improvement in 
basic services. Political reforms have to address the exclusion of those sectors of society 
that are composed of the rural sector and urban poor, as well as seeking a political 
formula that would include the participation of the current leftist movements. In the area 
of economic reform, the current regime needs t~ undermine the subterranean economy 
that is composed of sicarios [hired assassins], security enterprises and transient workers, 
which undermines primary sources of income. Once the marginalized sectors of society 
begin to see the effects of the state's efforts, the reasons to support the current Left will 
disappear. 
In order to deal with the narco-trafficking problem, the state must reinforce the 
internal security apparatus assisting in re-establishing the rule of law. The current regime 
does not count on the support of a strong Judicial Branch. Jorge G. Castaneda in Utopia 
Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War, highlights the importance of the 
Judiciary by stating, "an independent judiciary is of utmost priority in building and 
consolidating democratic rule."m The autonomy and integrity of this single institution is 
critical to the democratic process because it provides the vehicle by which the rule of law 
is implemented. However, the Colombian Judiciary is often the object of criticism 
135 Jorge G. Castaneda" p. 385. 
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because of its failure to deal "effectively with common criminals, guerrillas, and 
narcotraffickers. ,,136 
The principal institution, the Judicial Branch, should receive extra resources and 
training. This institution's budget, which at its highest point was 3.7 percent of the 
national budget (1983), has seen a steady decline in resources. Since 1987 it has held 
steady at 2 percent, in fact declining in real terms. 137 By means of comparison, the 
legislative and executive branches received approximately 27 percent. 138 The 
government's low investment translates into only 38 percent of the caseloads being 
processed by the courts. A major factor in why criminal activity and private security is 
high is this lack of prosecution; given that this is a judicial system were judges still 
conduct their own investigations. Therefore, Colombia needs to develop and implement 
extensive judicial reforms; in order to cope with the criminality associated with the drug 
trade. 
3. The One Problem Solution 
In this scenario the guerrilla and the drug problem are viewed as one and the 
same. In fact, the preceding section has offered substantial evidence that supports this 
argument. The initial ideological basis for the existence of Colombia's guerrilla 
movement has been transformed by the organizations' near-monopoly of the drug trade. 
F ARC, ELN and others are more concerned with the survival of their monopoly and the 
economic profits it generates than in any process of negotiation. By their involvement in 
136 Jorge P. Osterling, p.341. 
137 Francisco E. Thoumi, p. 89. 
138 Tina Rosenberg, p. 43. 
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criminal activity they have forfeited any rights granted to combatants. Therefore, the 
strategy is simplistic in nature - go after the guerrilla organizations with the full combat 
power of the state's security organizations. This has to be tempered with social and 
political refonns, because inequalities still exist. The state should endeavor to 
consolidate its position, thus gaining moral and political authority, while denying the 
guerrilla forces the very source of their strength - the terrain and some popular support. 
This program would be very similar to the successful Civil Action Operations conducted 
by the United States Marine Corps during the Vietnam era. It combines security, social 
development, infrastructure development and political education to deny the enemy of 
precious resources. 
I. CONCLUSION 
It is conjecture to know for certain whether the guerrilla forces in Colombia are 
ready for a peaceful settlement. Guerrilla groups are so dominant in certain areas that it is 
very difficult to hypothesize what social, political and economic refonns would lure them 
into serious negotiations. What is certain is the fact that the current regime lacks the 
leverage to force a negotiated solution. Therefore, it is imperative for the state to seek a 
strategy that will make the cost and the risk associated with guerrilla activity extremely 
high. This strategy has to include not only a clear military end-state, but also strong 
social, political and economic refonns. At this point in the process the rebels seem to 
hold a distinct advantage - not numerical, but strategic. Any settlement that grants 
extraordinary prerogatives to the guerrillas or worse yet, creates two separate Colombias, 
is unacceptable to Colombians and the international community. 
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Furthennore, Colombia's democratic consolidation depends on the ability of the 
political elite to solve this political dilemma. They have to close the social-political gap 




A. PROSPECTS FOR FULL DEMOCRATIZATION 
The argument that democracy in Colombia is at risk, is nothing new to 
policymakers, scholars and regional experts of Latin American affairs. Linz, Stepan, La 
Rotta, Thoumi and others all have reached the same conclusion - that democracy in 
Colombia, barring major political, social, economic, and military reforms, is on the verge 
of collapse. There is ample evidence that high levels of corruption, domestic violence, 
institutional decline, and political disintegration in Colombian society are the principal 
motives for the "erosion of democracy.,,139 The erosion of the political elite's legitimacy, 
efficacy, and effectiveness to govern has directly contributed to the increase in political 
violence and a weakening of the state. 
It is not new that Colombia needs to address significant problems within its 
political institutions in order to solidify its democratic gains, or that the country's 
political society needs to develop a national strategy that would lead to the establishment 
of full democratization. Nor, that the strategy should include elements that would address 
the structural shortcomings of Colombia's political institutions and assist in the 
consolidation of the state. 
What is new in this work, is the discussion of the potential breakdown of 
democracy in Colombia within the framework of legitimacy, effectiveness and efficacy 
139 Samuel P. Huntington, pp. 392-393. 
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provided by Juan Linz, while specifically examining Colombia's structural and non-
structural problems. Using the above discussion as a departure point, we can con finn that 
the current Colombian regime is in the process of breakdown as a democratic institution. 
It may be, as John A. Peeler points out, that "we are witnessing a process of de-
consolidation, of slow-motion breakdown.,,14o However, some may argue, as does this 
thesis, that democratic consolidation never occurred. Although the basic tenets for 
consolidation - rules of the game, mass participat.ion and political institutions - have 
been present, Colombia lacks the behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional requirements 
for full democratization. Colombia's political elites, to use Linz's words, has shown "a 
tendency to blame the accumulation of problems on neglect by a previous regime, rather 
than on the intractability of social reality.,,141 
Colombia's structural problems, its political institutions, have hindered rather 
than promoted democratization. Two of these institutions - the Conservative and Liberal 
party - exercised a monopoly on the division of power in the political arena. This has 
resulted in the exclusion of other political actors, which have turned to the use of violence 
as a fonn of political expression. 
The non-structural problems - the guerillas and the cartels - seek to destroy the 
democratic process through the exploitation of fissures within a weak state. Colombia's 
problems in respect to the guerrillas and the cartels are twofold: 1) the threat to national 
140 John A. Peeler, p. 329. 
141 Juan J. Linz, p. 41. 
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security produced by the insurgency; and 2) the violent problems associated with the drug 
trade, which is a matter of internal national defense. 
To address the national security problem, the state must develop a coherent 
economic, social and political strategy. A strategy that focuses exclusively on military 
operations exclusively is destined to failure, given that the Colombian insurgency has the 
capability of operating in the political, social and economic arenas. 142 In order to make 
headway in the national defense problem the strategy must seek to strengthen the judicial 
process. 
However, this is all easier said than done, because the state seems to lack the 
cohesiveness and fortitude necessary to prevail. Too many factors make it weak - a 
judicial system that is corrupt, an uneven distribution of political and economic power, 
and a failed policy of peaceful co-existence. In short, the new regime's objective should 
be to develop a strategy that frees the country of its vicious circle, a cycle of weak 
government and armed violence, which leads to breakdown - which in tum, produces 
more violence. 143 Until the state develops a coherent national policy and directs the 
resources necessary to implement such policy, the insurgency and cartel problem will 
only continue to increase, especially in those areas where the presence of the state is 
weak. 
The most radical solution would be to move away from the current ineffective 
presidential system to a parliamentary system of government. This system would allow 
142 MajGen Jose R. Ibanez Sanchez, p. 415. 
143 Tina Rosenberg, pp. 24-25. 
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for proportional representation of all political factions and insure the participation of 
those excluded from the current two-party format. A parliamentary government would 
assist in generating true competition, in developing coalitions, and increasing the 
likelihood of the participation of the disloyal opposition. It would also reduce entrenched 
party loyalties. However, it is very unlikely that a shift to parliamentarism will occur. 
This is due to two factors: 1) the current political elite would be forced to abdicate 
considerable amount of political power; and 2) the United States political system is 
presidential and Latin American countries have viewed it as the model in the region. 
Another structural solution would be to empower local government with the 
authority and means to provide the basic social services of government in areas where the 
disloyal opposition presence is strongest. This would contribute to heightening the 
visibility of government, enhancing its effectiveness and efficacy. This would also 
promote the consolidation of the State. Initially this policy would require an increase in 
the presence of security forces in order to regain regime leverage and regime control. 
However, as the government regains credibility, the role of security forces in the areas 
affected could diminish. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee is not blind to the fact that 
Colombia is "a restricted democracy that has been corrupted not just by drug traffickers, 
but by the power of the political class."144 The breakdown of democracy in Colombia 
144 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 1996. Corruption and Drugs in Colombia: 
Democracy at Risk. (Washington, D.C.: GPO), p. 7. 
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could affect democratic institutions throughout the area, specifically the weak nations in 
the Andean Ridge and Venezuela, as well as cause ,severe instability to the already weak 
economies of the region, Furthermore, insurgent groups in Peru, Venezuela and even 
Mexico could orchestrate similar breakdowns by imitating the Colombian model. u.s. 
policy would have to be significantly altered to reflect the new political situation if 
Colombia fails to reestablish strong democratic institutions. 
The military aid provided by the United States, no matter how minimal, gives the 
Colombian military the means by which to protect some of its autonomy, but has failed to 
meet its objective of increasing military effectiveness in promoting internal security and 
social and economic progress. This is due to the fact that a significant amount of military 
aid is slated solely for use in counter-narcotics operation. The United States must make a 
basic decision. This decision is whether to attack the Colombian drug and guerrilla 
problem as strictly an internal problem, in which case it should only support the military 
through normal Foreign Military Sales. The other option is to view Colombia's problems 
as an external threat and bring the full support of its resources (manpower, monetary, 
military and technological) to bear upon the problem. General Manuel Jose Bonett, of the 
Colombian Army, believes that increased U.S. military assistance might tum the tide in 
favor of the Colombian govemment. 145 The Colombian armed forces are not seeking U.S. 
personnel to fight their war. However, alone and without serious American support, they 
are doomed to failure. This may mean direct U.S. military involvement in Colombia's 
14S Global Intelligence Update, "Colombian Rebels Threaten Latin America's Stability and Economic 
Promise," available from http://www.stratfor.com; Internet; accessed 20 July 1998. 
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insurgency and drug trafficking problems, something U.S. policymakers are most anxious 
to avoid. 
The record of the United States, in terms of U.S. foreign policy towards 
Colombia, leaves plenty of room for argument. However, the choices left to Washington 
policymakers are not all sub-optimal. Policies should focus on strengthening the 
'Colombian State,' its legal institutions and the military. In addition, the U.S. should 
seek to develop confidence-building measures, such as modifying the U.S. drug 
certification process, in order to foster a more equitable relationship between the two 
nations. 
C. EPILOGUE 
Challenges to the Colombian regime go beyond those addressed in this thesis. 
They include problems of social disintegration, lack of identity, and penetration of 
violence into the very fiber of the country's social conscience. Colombia will continue to 
show signs of democratic breakdown until civil and political society are able to achieve 
an equitable solution to the country's myriad problems. In the short run, it must aim its 
efforts to solving the issues of narcotrafficking, guerrillas and social violence. One can 
infer - and the current literature demonstrates - that what the Colombians want is 
political, economic and social stability, provided by an effective, efficient and legitimate 
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